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Be secret and exult,
Because of all things known
That is most difficult.
- William Butler Yeats
All men by nature desire to know.
- Aristotle
Introduction
When a popular football coach or music teacher resigns in the
face of disputed allegations of misconduct, how much information
should be shared with the public? When a school board declines
to renew a superintendent's contract based on poor evaluations or
differing philosophies, how much information should be given to
the media? When parents complain about an employee at a public
school board meeting, how much should b6 discussed in public?
What is the role of the school board, in contrast to the school
administration, in personnel matters? Can school officials be held
liable for disclosing misconduct when responding to employment
reference requests? For not disclosing misconduct? These are just
a few of the many guises under which confidentiality of personnel
matters emerges as an issue on an almost daily basis.'
Access to information is a controversial issue in government
affairs, particularly for school districts and school employees.
Determining the appropriate release of personnel information is a
frequent challenge for school officials-a single personnel incident
can give rise to a multitude of legal and non-legal considerations
requiring or allowing either confidentiality or disclosure. Each
personnel matter is unique, and school districts must develop
rational policies, both flexible and practical, for release of informa-
tion.
1. Challenges arise most frequently with respect to teachers, coaches, superintendents
and other professional employees. As a result, primary focus is placed on issues relevant to
this group. However, many of these issues apply equally to non-professional school district
employees. We have tried throughout this article to indicate where different considerations
apply to professional or non-professional employees. This article is also relevant to local
government entities other than schools. Although this article focuses on schools and school
employees, many of the same considerations apply equally to counties, cities, townships,
boroughs and other local government entities.
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Many intricate legal requirements bear on this issue and
establish the core of the following analysis, yet the greatest
challenge to an effective policy stems from subjective consider-
ations. Ethics or public policy many times influence a decision to
release information where confidentiality is not imposed by law.
In addition, alleged employee misconduct can be highly controver-
sial, and school districts often endure significant media pressure
based on the public's "right to know." How are these factors to be
balanced against the harm to an employee's reputation caused by
releasing private information or with the need to protect student
witnesses? As every public official knows, strong forces push in
opposite directions.
The purpose of this article is to present a comprehensive
review of the competing interests and legal requirements, with the
goal of setting forth and reconciling all considerations. We trust
this will be helpful to school solicitors, school administrators, school
board members, school employees, employee organizations, the
media, and perhaps the courts. Toward this goal, Part One
addresses release to constituencies outside the district, with the first
section setting forth legal considerations and the second section
setting forth policy considerations. The third section balances these
multifarious interests and presents practical strategies for use by
school officials.2 Part Two moves to a separate issue which often
arises from the same facts, reviewing the implications of the school
administration sharing personnel information with the school board.
Part One-Release To The Public And Others Who Are Not
School Officials
I. Legal Considerations In Deciding On Release Of
Information
Legal considerations which bear on the decision to release
information include open government laws; specific statutory
reporting requirements; voluntary reporting to police; defamation
and privacy law liability concerns; the law relating to employment
reference requests; protection of student civil rights; protecting the
2. The public's interest in disclosure is the primary focus, but this interest must be
addressed in relation to other considerations. Discussion also focuses on reporting to police
and other government agencies, such as the Professional Standards and Practice Commission
and the Department of Public Welfare, as well as compliance with constitutional law and
protection of school officials from law suits alleging defamation or other legal claims.
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integrity of disciplinary hearings; student privacy law requirements;
and employee contractual rights. The discussion starts with open
government laws.
A. Right to Know Law, Sunshine Law, and School Code-The
Impetus for Disclosure
Pennsylvania has enacted open government statutes designed
to guarantee public access to information. These statutes define
the right of the press and individuals to obtain school personnel
and other information. Under the Right to Know Law, the public
may examine and inspect all school district "public records,"3 and
the Sunshine Law requires public notice and open meetings when
school boards discuss or act on school business.'
The Right to Know Law was first enacted in 1957,' and the
Sunshine Law was first enacted in 1974.6 The Sunshine Law was
reenacted in 1986,7 and has been amended several times since.8
Each amendment has reflected greater requirements for openness
in government affairs.9 The findings and declarations included in
the 1986 version are helpful in understanding the legislative intent
and strong public policies behind Pennsylvania's open government
statutes:
Findings-The General Assembly finds that the right of the
public to be present at all meetings of agencies and to witness
the deliberation, policy formulation and decisionmaking of
agencies is vital to the enhancement and proper functioning of
the democratic process and that secrecy in public affairs
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (West Supp. 1996).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 274 (West Supp. 1996). For definitions, citations and
detailed discussion of the Right to Know Law and Sunshine Law, see infra Part One I.A.
5. 1957 Pa. Laws 390 (June 21, 1957).
6. 1974 Pa. Laws 486 (July 19, 1974).
7. 1986 Pa. Laws 388 (July 3, 1986). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 271-286 (West
Supp. 1996).
8. Section 10.1 was added in 1993, guaranteeing a right of public participation in public
agency meetings. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 280.1 (West Supp. 1996). Section 8 was amended
in 1996 to require public discussion of school board deliberations related to appointment of
new school board members. 1996 Pa. Legis. Serv. 16 (Purdon 1996).
9. The 1986 reenactment substantially broadened the requirements for openness. See
THOMAS J. GENTZEL, PENNSYLVANIA'S OPEN MEETINGS LAW: A GUIDE TO OPERATING
IN THE 'SUNSHINE' FOR SCHOOL BOARDS 9-12 (Pennsylvania School Boards Association
1986) (comparing 1986 law to 1974 law). The amendments since 1986 have also broadened
the requirements for openness. See supra note 8.
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undermines the faith of the public in government and the
public's effectiveness in fulfilling its role in a democratic society.
Declarations-The General Assembly hereby declares it to be
the public policy of this Commonwealth to insure the right of
its citizens to have notice of and the right to attend all meetings
of agencies at which any agency business is discussed or acted
upon as provided in this act.10
These statements and similar policy determinations underlying
the Right to Know Law reflect a presumption that secrecy under-
mines the relationship between a democratic government and its
citizens.' Members of the public and the media often rely on
these policy determinations in interpreting Pennsylvania's open
government laws and asking full disclosure of personnel informa-
tion.
The School Code also demands publicity in certain situations,
but is more focused, applying only to final hiring and dismissal
decisions. 2
Without a doubt, the legislature also recognized the other side
of this issue, including the need for privacy in order to protect
individual rights and ensure efficient and effective government. As
a result, all three statutes include exemptions allowing confiden-
tiality of many personnel issues. We address next the specific
requirements of these statutes, and the balance struck between
disclosure and confidentiality.
1. Right to Know Law.-The Right to Know Law is the first
stopping point. It describes the records of school districts and
other Pennsylvania agencies which must be open to the public as
"public records," as well as those which may be held confidential.
While personnel information is not specifically excluded from the
definition of "public records," the limited scope of the definition
and specific exemptions indicate the appropriateness of privacy in
certain employee affairs. 3 Some personnel information is re-
10. 65 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 272 (West Supp. 1996).
11. The Third Circuit recently described what it called the "enduring beliefs underlying
freedom of information laws"-"that an informed public is desirable, that access to
information prevents governmental abuse and helps secure freedom, and that, ultimately,
government must answer to its citizens." Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 792
(3d Cir. 1994).
12. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5-508, 11-1129 (West 1992).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (West Supp. 1996).
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quired to be disclosed; some is protected from mandatory disclo-
sure.
As demonstrated in the following sections, disclosure generally
is not required of employment-related records such as personnel
files, 4 settlement agreements connected with disciplinary or
dismissal proceedings, and recordings of executive session or
private hearing discussions or decisions.5 On the other hand,
documents such as public employee payroll records are considered
public records. 6 In determining public record status, the specific
content of each record must be considered on a case-by-case basis.
a. The basic requirement, definitions, and exemptions. -Under
the Right to Know Law, "[e]very public record of an agency shall,
at reasonable times, be open for examination and inspection by any
citizen of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." 7 The definition
of a "public record" includes any "contract dealing with the receipt
or disbursement of funds by an agency" and "any minute, order or
decision by an agency fixing the personal or property rights,
privileges, immunities, duties or obligations of any person .... "8
However, the definition specifically provides an "investigation
exemption" and a "reputation exemption," excluding from
mandatory disclosure all communications which would reveal the
result of an official agency "investigation," and records "which
would operate to the prejudice or impairment of a person's reputa-
tion or personal security.'
19
b. Personnel files.-Personnel files are not considered public
records and cannot be obtained under the Right to Know Law. In
14. See infra Part One I.A.l.b.
15. See infra Part One I.A.l.c.
16. See infra Part One I.A.l.d.
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.2 (West 1959).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (West Supp. 1996).
19. Id. Note there are two separate exclusions-one related to effect on "a person's
reputation" and the other related to "personal security." Id Personal security has been '
interpreted as relating to protection from actual harm. The Right to Know Law does not
include protection from invasion of privacy. Tribune-Review Publishing Co. v. Allegheny
County Hous. Auth., 662 A.2d 677, 684 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995); City of Chester v. Getak,
572 A.2d 1319 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990). However, if privacy of certain records is protected
by another statute, the Right to Know Law does not require disclosure. Tribune-Review, 662
A.2d at 682 (holding that social security numbers need not be released). See discussion of
Mirror Printing case as to the "reputation exemption" infra in text accompanying note 30.
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West Shore School District v. Homick ° an employee sought to
inspect his personnel file, including results of rating evaluations.21
The court ruled the file was not a "minute, order or decision" of
the school board and did not fix any "rights, privileges, immunities,
duties or obligations" of the teacher.22 Although information
contained in the record could be used to fix the teacher's rights in
the future, the court interpreted the law as referring only to the
present effect of the record.' Personnel files are now accessible
to employees under another Pennsylvania statute,24 but the
Homick case makes clear that personnel files, including evaluations,
directives and reprimand letters, are not open to the general
public.'
Similarly, in Marvel v. Dalrymple, 6 the court held that
employee rating sheets and evaluations by superiors are not
available under the Right to Know Law.27 Although the court did
not address the basic question of whether rating sheets or evalua-
tions fall within the first part of the "public record" definition, the
court ruled that such items are excluded as a result of the "reputa-
tion exemption."'
c. Disciplinary hearing records and settlement agree-
ments-The first part of the "public record" definition, referring to
contracts, minutes, and decisions, would encompass many employ-
ment related settlement agreements and, arguably, recordings of
executive session school board discussions and decisions. But, in
fact, an exemption will usually apply to the extent such records
contain information related to discipline or dismissal. Disciplinary
actions often involve official investigations, and impairment of
reputation is an almost certain result of allowing public access to
hearing records or settlement agreements containing explanations
20. 353 A.2d 93 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976). See also Condon v. Dallastown Area Sch.
Dist., 67 Pa. D & C.2d 200, 201 (Pa.C.P. York County 1974).
21. 353 A.2d at 94.
22. Id. at 95.
23. Id. at 95. The teacher in this case was not subject to any pending disciplinary action.
Id. If he had been or the file contained negative information, the personnel file might also
have been shielded by the "reputation exemption" if access were requested by a third party.
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1322 (West 1991).
25. Homick, 353 A.2d at 95.
26. 393 A.2d 494 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
27. Id. at 498.
28. Id. at 498.
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of employee misconduct or poor performance. As a result, such
records generally are not available to the public.29
In Mirror Printing Co. v. Altoona Area School Board,3 0 a
newspaper sought access to a settlement agreement under which a
teacher agreed to a six-month suspension.31  The court denied
disclosure under the Right to Know Law, reasoning that release
would harm the teacher's reputation.32  Although the court
avoided discussion of the actual content of the agreement due to its
confidential nature, the court made clear that its decision resulted
from the agreement containing the factual basis for the teacher's
suspension.33
In deciding whether a particular document is accessible to the
public under the Right to Know Law or any other open govern-
ment statute, it is necessary to consider all potentially applicable
statutes. For instance, the Sunshine Law will require disclosure of
certain parts of a settlement agreement even though the entire
settlement agreement may remain confidential under Mirror
Printing.
34
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg35 is another case involving
a settlement agreement. In Pansy, the former Stroudsburg
Borough police chief filed a civil rights action in federal court
against the Borough based on his demotion and suspension for
29. See e.g., Mellin v. City of Allentown, 430 A.2d 1048 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (holding
that transcripts of closed disciplinary hearing of city council are not public records), Mirror
Printing Co. v. Altoona Area Sch. Bd., 609 A.2d 917 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (holding
settlement agreements unavailable under the Right to Know Law).
30. 609 A.2d 917 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
31. Id. at 918.
32. Id. at 920.
33. Id. at 918-19. Settlement agreements which do not contain the basis of a disciplinary
matter or other information harmful to a person's reputation, and which are unrelated to an
official investigation, may be subject to disclosure under the Right to Know Law. See
Morning Call, Inc. v. Lower Saucon Township, 627 A.2d 297 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
Morning Call involved a newspaper seeking disclosure of a settlement agreement between
the Township and an individual who filed a civil rights action against the Township claiming
improper actions by the police unrelated to any personnel issue. Id. at 298. The parties
entered into a settlement agreement under which the individual received monetary
compensation. Payment was made through the Township's insurance carrier subject to a
$5,000 deductible. Id. In this case, the Township argued the agreement did not fall within
the general definition of a "public record" because funds were disbursed indirectly through
the Township's insurance carrier. Id at 299. However, the court ruled the agreement was
a public record because it obligated the Township to disburse the $5,000 deductible payment
to the insurance carrier. Id. at 300.
34. See infra Part One I.A.2.
35. 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994).
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alleged improper activities.3 6 Prior to trial, the police chief and
the Borough agreed to settle the case, and as part of the settlement
the federal district court entered an order that the settlement terms
were to be kept confidential. 7 While not ruling directly on this
point, the Third Circuit stated its belief that the settlement
agreement terms would most likely, in the absence of the court's
confidentiality order, be available to the public under
Pennsylvania's Right to Know Law." Although the Third Circuit
relied on the Morning Call case as authority for this statement, it
did not consider the holding of Mirror Printing.9 An analysis
applying the holding of Mirror Printing might demand a different
result when a settlement agreement discloses facts harmful to the
former employee's reputation. On the other hand, arguably the
reputation exemption would be inapplicable because the employee
already disclosed the facts concerning the demotion and suspension
in public litigation documents.' The Pansy case shows that a
settlement agreement might be viewed in a different context once
litigation has commenced or facts have otherwise been made public.
The Pansy case also raises the question of whether a court may
supersede the open government statutes through a court imposed
confidentiality order.41
Although Mirror Printing clearly held that a settlement agree-
ment is not a public record under the Right to Know Law, because
of the difficulty of reconciling this holding with the requirements of
the Sunshine Law, and the expansive language in the Pansy case,
some lawyers representing school districts take the position that
settlement agreements are public records. This strategy avoids a
potential legal issue.
d. Records of public funds -To the contrary, public agency
records reflecting a monetary transaction such as the disbursement
of funds pursuant to a settlement agreement,42 or other financial
records such as canceled checks,43 generally are considered public
36. Id. at 776.
37. Id. at 776.
38. Id. at 784-85, 792.
39. Id. at 784.
40. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 776.
41. See infra Part One I.A.4.
42. Morning Call, Inc. v. Lower Saucon Township, 627 A.2d 297,299-300 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1993).
43. Carbondale Township v. Murray, 440 A.2d 1273, 1274 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
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records. Likewise, public school employee salary records are public
information.'
e. The personnel exception balancing test.-As indicated by
Mirror Printing, the "reputation exemption" has been interpreted
as a personnel exception to the public disclosure mandate.45 How-
ever, the exception is not absolute. Its application is determined
through a balancing test, under which the benefits of releasing the
information are weighed against the individual employee's interest
to be protected.' In Mirror Printing, the court determined that
the employee interest outweighed the public's right to know. 7
Depending on the facts, it is possible a court would reach a
different conclusion in another case.
Significantly, the decision to invoke the personnel exception
under the Right to Know Law is made by the public agency. There
is nothing in this statute mandating secrecy of records not deemed
public records, whether the records relate to personnel or any other
matter. Exclusion from public record status merely allows the
agency to opt for privacy if it so desires. No rights are granted by
this statute to employees.
2. Sunshine Law and School Code.-Both the Sunshine Law
and School Code expressly establish personnel exceptions which
provide for confidential treatment of certain employment matters
during school board meetings. In this sense, they mirror the Right
to Know Law. But there is a significant difference. These statutes
require publicity as to final decisions on personnel matters and, in
this respect, require disclosure of information which might remain
private under the Right to Know Law. 8
a. Sunshine Law.-Like the Right to Know Law, the
Sunshine Law reflects an expectation of privacy with regard to
personnel matters, shielding most employee information from
44. 20 Op. Pa. Att'y Gen. 45 (1973). See also Kanzelmeyer v. Eger, 329 A.2d 307 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1974)(ruling that school employee attendance records are public records).
45. Mirror Printing, 609 A.2d at 920.
46. Id. See also Tribune-Review Publ'g Co. v. Allegheny County Hous. Auth., 662 A.2d
677, 682 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
47. Mirror Printing, 609 A.2d at 920.
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 278 (West Supp. 1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5-508,
11-1126, 11-1129 (West 1992). Of course, another difference is that the personnel exception
in the Right to Know Law results not from language expressly referring to personnel issues,
but from judicial interpretation of the "reputation exemption."
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public scrutiny. The Sunshine Law requires that all "official
action" and "deliberation" by members of a public agency take
place during an open meeting,49 but provides that school boards
and other public bodies may hold closed executive sessions "[t]o
discuss any matter involving the employment, appointment,
termination of employment, terms and conditions of employment,
evaluation of performance, promotion or disciplining of any ...
employee ...."50
The protection of personnel matters from open meeting
requirements is not absolute. The Sunshine Law personnel excep-
tion applies only to discussions, and does not negate the require-
ment that official action take place at a public meeting.5' Accord-
ingly, while hearings and discussions on personnel matters may take
place in private, in order to be legally effective, employment
termination or other action requiring a school board decision must
occur during a public meeting.52
Although not confirmed by case law, it appears that, as with
the Right to Know Law, the decision to hold an executive session
rests with the public agency, not the employee.5 3  The statute
expressly states that the employee whose rights could be adversely
affected "may request, in writing," that the matter be discussed at
an open meeting.54 However, there is no indication the school
board is required to follow the employee's request.5 In fact,
employee requests that matters be discussed in open meetings are
rare, and school boards invariably elect to discuss personnel matters
in private, absent extremely unusual circumstances.
b. School Code.-The Pennsylvania School Code also reflects
the expectation of privacy for personnel discussions, but not
decisions. School Code Section 1126 stipulates professional
employee dismissal hearings are public, but the employee must be
granted a private dismissal hearing upon request.5 6 In contrast to
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 274 (West Supp. 1996).
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 278(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996). A 1996 amendment to the
Sunshine Law specifies that this subsection "shall not apply to any meeting involving the
appointment or selection of any person to fill a vacancy in any elected office." Id.
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 274, 278(c) (West Supp. 1996).
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 274 (West Supp. 1996).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 278(a) (West Supp. 1996).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1126 (West 1992).
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Sunshine Law provisions applicable to employment discussions of
all types, the decision to hold a private dismissal hearing rests with
the employee, not the school district. 7 But in keeping with the
Sunshine Law, School Code Sections 508 and 1129 require a
"public" school board vote on dismissals."
c. Amount of required disclosure--Settlement agree-
ments-Sunshine Law balancing test.-In the case of school district
professional employees, the Sunshine Law allows and the School
Code ensures employees a certain degree of confidentiality in
disciplinary proceedings.
In Mirror Printing, the newspaper sought disclosure under the
Sunshine Law of the basis for the teacher's suspension, and a copy
of the settlement agreement by which the teacher agreed to
disciplinary action.59 The newspaper argued that under the
Sunshine Law, official action taken at a public meeting required
such disclosure.' Prior to signing the agreement, the school board
held a closed disciplinary hearing at the teacher's request.61 Later,
the school board in open session adopted a resolution stating the
main settlement terms agreed to by the teacher, including a six-
month suspension, payment of school district legal expenses
resulting from the hearing, and waiver of rights to further legal
action.62
The court denied disclosure of the actual agreement, finding
the teacher's right to confidentiality in a disciplinary proceeding
outweighs the public's right to know.' Noting the teacher
properly invoked his right to a private hearing under the School
Code, the court held that the resolution passed at the open
meeting, which omitted the factual basis for the action, but stated
the key settlement points, was adequate to satisfy the Sunshine Law
requirement that official action be taken during open session.'
57. Id. No comparable provision exists for non-professional school district employees.
However, as a practical matter, most Pennsylvania school boards provide all employees with
a choice of a public or private hearing.
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5-508, 11-1129 (West 1992).




63. Id. at 920.
64. Mirror Printing, 609 A.2d at 919-20. Compare with Keenheel v. Pa. Sec. Comm'n,
579 A.2d 1358 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (holding that failure of Commission to vote on
settlement agreement in public violated Sunshine Law).
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The court, in essence, applied a balancing test, just as applied under
the Right to Know Law, in determining the amount of disclosure
required to satisfy the Sunshine Law requirement for approval at
a public meeting. It reconciled the Sunshine Law mandate with the
Sunshine Law and School Code privacy protections by requiring
public approval of key terms, but allowing privacy of the actual
contract which included additional details and factual information.
This case is important not only in providing guidance for handling
disciplinary settlement agreements, but also in establishing a
balancing test to determine the amount of disclosure necessary to
satisfy the Sunshine Law.
3. School Board decisions and the Local Agency
Law.-Absent a settlement agreement or employee consent to
school district action, many personnel actions adverse to an
employee require a school board decision more detailed than a
simple resolution stating the action taken. Usually the law
mandates a written school board decision containing findings of fact
and conclusions of law. This requirement generally applies as a
result of the Local Agency Law65 to dismissal of nonprofessional
employees pursuant to School Code Section 514,6 dismissal of
untenured teachers pursuant to School Code Section 1108,67 and
might apply to disciplinary suspensions depending on the length of
the suspension.' Similarly, school boards usually provide written
decisions in connection with dismissal of tenured professional
employees. 69 Does such a decision constitute a public record?
65. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 105, 551-555, 751-754 (West 1995).
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5-514 (West 1992).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1108 (West 1992).
68. The Local Agency Law requires that all "adjudications" be in writing and contain
findings and the reasons for the adjudication. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 555 (West 1995).
The Local Agency Law defines "adjudication" as any final decision affecting "personal or
property rights, privileges, immunities, duties .... " 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 (West
1995). In Rike v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 494 A.2d 1388 (Pa. 1985), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, without discussing what constitutes an adjudication, ruled that
an eight-month disciplinary suspension of a teacher was an adjudication under the Local
Agency Law. Id. at 1390. In Elliott v. City of Pittsburgh, 638 A.2d 413 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994), the Commonwealth Court ruled that a seven-day disciplinary suspension of a police
official was an adjudication under the Local Agency Law. Id. at 415-16. Of course, it is
possible the courts might conclude that a shorter disciplinary suspension does not sufficiently
affect personal or property rights to constitute an adjudication; this issue has not yet been
addressed definitively by the courts.
69. The requirement for a written decision generally arises under the Local Agency
Law. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 555 (West 1995). Although school board action dismissing
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Does the Sunshine Law require the written explanation of the
decision to be made public as a part of the official action imple-
menting the school board decision?
While the Mirror Printing case generally removes a personnel
decision from public record status under the Right to Know Law,
application of the Sunshine Law is murky. A strong argument can
be made that an adjudication supported by findings and conclusions
is just like a settlement agreement; as long as the key points of the
decision are made public through a resolution specifying the action
taken, the Sunshine Law "official action" requirement is satisfied,
and the detailed findings and conclusions may be shielded from the
public eye. This position is strongly supported by the statutory
language. The statute authorizes privacy for personnel discussions,
then simply mandates that "official action" on such discussions
occur in public.7" "Official action" is defined to include "the
decision" made by the school board and "the vote taken" by the
school board.7 There is no indication that detailed findings or
explanations underlying the "decision" or "vote" must be released
in public.72 Moreover, Mirror Printing expressly ruled that the
Sunshine Law does not require disclosure of the basis for a disci-
plinary suspension resolved through a settlement agreement,73 and
there is no policy reason compelling a different result simply
because the suspension is imposed by a unilateral board decision or
because the board decides to take some action other than sus-
pension.
On the other hand, there currently are no court decisions on
this issue. A court might rule that the required findings and
conclusions are not legally effective under the Sunshine Law unless
revealed to the public eye. The reasoning behind such a ruling
could be either that the Local Agency Law requires school board
findings and conclusions, and the Sunshine Law precludes the
findings and conclusions from becoming legally effective unless
made a point of official action, or that the findings and conclusions
a professional employee pursuant to School Code § 1129, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1129
(West 1992), might not require a written decision under the holding of Boehm v. Bd. of
Educ., 373 A.2d 1372 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977), school boards nevertheless generally provide
a written decision.
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 278(c), 274 (West Supp. 1996).
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 273 (West Supp. 1996).
72. Id.
73. Mirror Printing, 609 A.2d at 920.
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are part of the "decision" which the Sunshine Law requires occur
in public. In the absence of a court ruling on this issue, school
districts face the risk that a personnel decision challenged by an
employee will be overturned if findings and conclusions are not
made public. Of course, this is very different from a Mirror
Printing situation in which an employee consents to discipline,
perhaps motivated in part to avoid publicity.
Acknowledging that this issue is unresolved, school districts
may be best advised to make required findings and conclusions part
of the public record and avoid the risk of reversal of important
personnel decisions. In cases where the employee has released
incorrect information, it may also be important to school officials
to disseminate correct facts. Countervailing factors may change the
equation in certain cases, for example, when there is a need to
protect student victims of employee misconduct from damaging
publicity.74 Ultimately, the facts of each case will dictate whether
the school district should release the detailed findings or just the
decision stating the action taken.
4. Court confidentiality orders.-This article has so far
discussed the impact of open government laws on public disclosure
of personnel information. However, aside from the open govern-
ment laws, confidentiality is sometimes imposed in the litigation
context by court order, usually at the request of both parties. In
the Pansy case discussed above,75 a former police chief sued
Stroudsburg Borough in federal court claiming a civil rights
violation based on his demotion and suspension for alleged illegal
activities.76 The parties settled the litigation, and the court
entered an order requiring the settlement terms to be kept
confidential.77 As explained in Pansy, courts generally have the
power to require confidentiality of litigation settlement agree-
ments. 78  This power is based on the belief that confidentiality
sometimes encourages settlement, and that encouraging settlement
74. The Court in Mirror Printing made clear that the public's right to know under the
Sunshine Law must be balanced against the rights of individuals to confidentiality in
appropriate circumstances. Id. at 920. This includes the rights of individual employees who
are the target of personnel decisions; the balance tips even more clearly to confidentiality
where innocent victims are involved.
75. 23 F.3d 772 23 F.3d at 776. See supra Part One I.A.1.




1997] CONFIDENTIALITY OF SCHOOL PERSONNEL MATTERS 343
of litigation is desirable as a matter of public policy.79 However,
in reversing the confidentiality order, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that confidentiality orders should be entered by
federal courts only where the information likely would not be
accessible under a federal or state freedom of information law.'0
On the contrary, the court ruled that in cases where it is likely
freedom of information laws would require access, a strong
presumption exists against granting a confidentiality order.8 ' As
shown by the Pansy case, there might be circumstances where facts
or a settlement agreement which are part of litigation become
confidential through a court order, even though a different result
would occur under open government statutes, but in most cases the
courts will not impose confidentiality contrary to open government
statutes.
5. Open Government Laws summary.-The Pennsylvania
open government laws impose legal requirements for disclosure, but
also provide legal safe harbors allowing privacy in certain personnel
matters. The Right to Know Law denominates certain documents,
primarily contracts and decisions, as public records. The Sunshine
Law generally mandates that official discussion occur at public
meetings. The Sunshine Law and the School Code require that
final decisions be made in public. However, all of these statutes
include a "personnel exception," and no law requires public
discussion of personnel matters. Therefore, personnel files,
disciplinary hearing records, and disciplinary settlement agreements
generally are not public records subject to mandatory disclosure,
but records dealing with the disbursement of public funds must be
disclosed.
Although the open government statutes allow privacy, they do
not ensure privacy. The decision whether to discuss a matter in
public or private is generally a decision made by the school district,
not the employee. Moreover, the open government laws are just
the beginning of the analysis in determining whether disclosure is
required in many circumstances. As demonstrated in the following
sections, there are various other specific statutes requiring limited
reporting and confidentiality of certain kinds of conduct, and school
79. Id. at 785-86.
80. Id. at 791.
81. Id. at 792.
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districts also need to consider potential monetary liability from
either improper disclosure or improper failure to disclose under
defamation law, privacy law, contract law or civil rights law. The
examination turns now to specific legal mandates for reporting and
confidentiality.
B. Department of Education and Professional Standards and
Practices Commission Reporting Requirements
The Professional Standards and Practice Commission is the
state agency with authority over suspension and revocation of
professional educator certification. 2 The School Code creates a
complex interplay between local districts, the Department and the
Commission with respect to certification issues.8 3 In all cases, the
Department has an initial investigative role, possibly followed by
hearings and formal Commission action depending on the Depart-
ment's findings.' In some cases of misconduct, the School Code
requires reporting to the Department. In other cases, even
where reporting is not mandatory, school entities may be required
to provide information at a hearing conducted by the Commission.
Of course, the end result of school district reporting may be the
employee's loss of the certification required for public education
employment.
Although school districts are not required to disclose reported
information to the public, and in fact are subject to confidentiality
restrictions, the Commission's records are ultimately open to the
public in cases where the Commission metes out discipline other
than a private reprimand. 6
Under School Code Section 2070.9, the school district superin-.
tendent is required to report to the Department of Education
instances where: (a) the school entity has dismissed a certificated
employee "for cause"'; and (b) the superintendent is aware that
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2070.5(11) (West Supp. 1996).
83. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2070.1-2070.18 (West Supp. 1996). These provisions
of the School Code are also known as the "Professional Standards Act."
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2070.11-.13 (West Supp. 1996).
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2070.9(b) (West Supp. 1996).
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2070.10 (West Supp. 1996).
87. Referring to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1108 and 11-1122 (West Supp. 1996), "for
cause" includes dismissal for immorality, incompetency, unsatisfactory teaching performance,
intemperance, cruelty, persistent negligence, wilful neglect of duties, inability to perform
essential functions of employment due to disability, advocation of or participation in un-
American or subversive doctrines, conviction of a felony or acceptance of a guilty plea or
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a certificated employee has been formally charged or convicted of
a crime of moral turpitude, or some other offense requiring
mandatory suspension or revocation of certification under the
School Code."8
The question frequently arises whether reporting is required
where an employee is not formally dismissed, but resigns in the
face of accusations which constitute cause for dismissal. If the
resigning employee has been formally charged with or convicted of
a crime of moral turpitude, reporting is clearly required. 9 If,
however, the employee has not been charged and resigns, the
School Code does not mandate reporting but the Department
encourages it. As shown by official forms distributed to school
districts for reporting dismissals and resignations,' the Depart-
ment acknowledges the mandatory nature of reporting dismissals
for cause, and the optional nature of reporting resignations under
similar circumstances. In cases where reporting is optional, school
officials need to consider the severity of the problem and the
possibility or likelihood of future recurrence. If there is a proba-
bility of future recurrence, school officials might conclude there is
a moral and ethical duty to report, in order to allow the Depart-
ment and the Commission to decide if the individual should be
barred from future public education employment for the protection
of public school children.
Proceedings to revoke an educator's certification may be
commenced before the Commission by a school entity or any
interested party.91 Accordingly, even if a school district decides
not to report or file a complaint, another party might do so,
resulting in an investigation or hearings by the Commission for
which the school entity is requested to provide information or
testimony.
nolo contendere therefore, or persistent and wilful violation of or failure to comply with
Pennsylvania's school laws. Id-
88. See School Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2070.5(11) (West Supp. 1996). The
reference to "other offense" in this clause currently appears only to apply in the case of a
crime involving drug addiction. The School Code previously included other provisions for
mandatory suspension or revocation; however, these provisions were repealed at the time of
enactment of the legislation creating the Commission.
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2070.9(b)(2) (West Supp. 1996).
90. The Department form labels reporting of "dismissals" as "mandatory," and includes
a separate section for reporting "resignations" which is not labeled "mandatory."
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2070.9(b) (West Supp. 1996).
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The Code also contains confidentiality provisions. There is
first a general confidentiality provision dictating that "[a]ll
information relating to any complaints, or any proceedings relating
to or resulting from such complaints, shall remain confidential,
unless or until discipline, other than a private reprimand, is ordered
,92 As an exception, release of information previously
disclosed to the public, either as the result of a school district
action to dismiss for cause or a charge or conviction for a crime of
moral turpitude or another offense requiring mandatory suspension
or revocation of certificate, is not prohibited.93
The Code also makes it a criminal offense for a school
employee to release "information received at a commission meeting
or hearing or through the investigation of a professional educator
or through any disciplinary proceedings conducted pursuant to this
act, without authorization of the commission."94  Material wit-
nesses or their representatives are also subject to this restriction.95
Disciplinary hearings conducted by the Commission are closed
to the public, unless an open hearing is requested by the employ-
ee.96 Moreover, even if the employee requests an open hearing,
the presiding officer is given discretion to close any portion of the
hearing for good cause.97
The School Code thus contains several clear directives for
confidentiality about personnel problems subject to proceedings by
the Department or the Commission, but it also leaves certain
questions unanswered. Clearly, school officials may not disclose a
complaint made to the Department, the existence of a Department
investigation, or any information received as a result of Commis-
sion proceedings. Similarly, information may be released if
dismissal charges are filed against an employee. On the other
hand, if an employee resigns rather than face dismissal and
Commission proceedings are commenced, the permissibility of
release of information on the events leading to the resignation is
less clear.
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2070.10 (West Supp. 1996). If the proceeding results in
discipline other than a private reprimand, all records pertaining to the matter become public.
93. Id.
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2070.17(a) (West Supp. 1996).
95. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2070.17(b) (West Supp. 1996).
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2070.13(c)(5) (West Supp. 1996).
97. Id.
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Another question which has confronted school officials is the
meaning of confidentiality under the law. When the Department
receives a complaint and commences an investigation, it often
notifies the school board president or superintendent of the
investigation and the confidentiality requirement. May such
officials share the information with the entire school board? The
business manager? The personnel director? Other school officials?
The statute does not answer these questions. However, as a
practical matter, the Department will generally consent to the
propriety of disclosure to a limited group with obvious proper
interest. Naturally, the Department's consent should be docu-
mented in writing.
C Child Abuse Reporting Obligations
The Child Protective Services Law98 imposes another limited
duty to disclose, requiring school employees to report instances of
suspected child abuse through specified channels of authority within
the school system.99 The proper procedure for reporting depends
on the source of the abuse: either a perpetrator connected with the
child's home life or a school employee." The duty to report
child abuse by school employees provides another instance of
mandatory, limited release of personnel information.
Although details of child abuse reporting obligations are
beyond the scope of this article, the key requirement of the Child
Protective Services Law is that school employees must report all
cases of suspected child abuse, either occurring in a child's home or
committed by a school employee, to a designated school adminis-
trator. Specifically with regard to child abuse committed by a
school employee, all school employees have an obligation to report
when they have reasonable cause to suspect a student coming
before them in their professional or official capacity is a victim of
serious bodily injury or sexual abuse or exploitation by a school
employee."°  The obligation applies to misconduct which
occurred on or off school property. Once child abuse has been
reported by a school employee, the designated administrator is
98. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6301-6384 (West 1991).
99. Id. The failure to report suspected abuse is criminally punishable as a summary
offense. A second offense is a third degree misdemeanor. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6319
(West Supp. 1996).
100. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6313, 6352 (West Supp. 1996).
101. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6352(a) (West Supp. 1996).
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required to report the abuse to local police and the district
attorney.'O°
As with Department of Education and Professional Standards
Commission proceedings, there are confidentiality provisions. The
Child Protective Services Law imposes a confidentiality restriction
designed to facilitate investigations and protect children and
employees: except in connection with a school district investigation
or other appropriate action connected with the abuse, the school
employee who makes the report may not reveal the existence or
content of the report.13
D. Legal Proceedings or Investigations
School districts may be called on to respond to many different
types of investigations or legal proceedings above and beyond
Professional Standards and Practices Commission proceedings and
child abuse investigations. This might include a civil lawsuit filed
by a parent or child, a criminal proceeding commenced by police,
or various types of administrative agency investigations. In the case
of proceedings of this nature, school districts might be required,
whether by subpoena, other legal process, or a perceived moral
duty, to provide relevant school employee information.
E. Voluntary Reporting to Police
Even in the absence of a statutory duty or external investi-
gation, school officials are often confronted with the question
whether they should immediately report a matter involving a
possible crime to the police for possible criminal prosecution.
What if an employee assaults a student in a manner not considered
sexual abuse and not causing serious bodily harm, thus not
triggering the mandatory reporting duty under the Child Protective
Services Law? What if an employee is accused of misappropriating
funds of a student group? What if the employee denies the
allegations and the truth is uncertain? If the offense is serious,
school officials might conclude that good judgment and public
policy require police involvement and a police decision on
prosecution.
102. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6353(a) (West Supp. 1996). Different provisions exist
for reporting of suspected abuse by a perpetrator connected with the child's home fife.
103. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6352(a)(3) (West Supp. 1996).
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E Monetary Liability for Improper Disclosure
So far we have considered a number of requirements or
reasons for disclosure, several specific requirements for confidenti-
ality, and other provisions allowing confidentiality if desired.
However, schools every day face decisions not addressed by specific
statutory requirements. There are obvious sound reasons for
school officials to disclose information in response to employment
reference requests, and possibly at times in response to other public
official, parent, or taxpayer requests. Moreover, the policies
underlying Pennsylvania's open government laws suggest that
public officials should favor disclosure. Are there risks in doing so?
This section discusses potential monetary liability, under defama-
tion and privacy law, for improper disclosure.
1. Defamation liability concerns.-Under Pennsylvania law,
a defamatory statement is a statement of fact-opinions generally
are not defamatory-that "tends so to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."'' " For
instance, a superintendent's response to an employment reference
request which indicates a teacher has consistently been rated
unsatisfactory or was involved in misconduct could be defamatory.
But this does not mean negative statements should never be
made. Protection of students, effective personnel management, and
at times other good reasons specific to a particular case mandate
open communication.
And the law provides appropriate safeguards. When a defama-
tion claim is asserted, liability will not be imposed if the person
who made the communication can prove: (1) its truth; (2) the
occasion was of a privileged character; or (3) the subject matter was
of public concern, regardless of the occasion."°5 Thus, truth is
always a defense, but even if truth cannot be proven or inaccurate
facts have been conveyed, a school district or school official acting
in good faith may be legally protected from liability by establishing
either a communication privilege or that the subject matter defense
covering issues of public concern.
104. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 923 (3d Cir.
1990).
105. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343(b) (West 1982).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
a. Privilege.-Privilege is extended to communications made
on a proper occasion, for a proper motive, in a proper manner, and
based on reasonable cause. °6 There are two levels of privilege
against defamation liability under Pennsylvania law, as well as a
general immunity granted to political subdivisions and public
employees.
Conditional privilege applies to occasions involving a proper
interest of the publisher or receiver of a defamatory communication
or a recognized interest of the public."° For instance, this gen-
eral privilege extends protection to employers granting employment
reference requests"°t or sharing employee information with other
employees having a proper interest.' 9 However, the privilege is
conditional in that employers can incur defamation liability for
abuse of privilege if the communication: (1) involves malice,
negligence, or is without just cause; (2) is not made for the purpose
of the privilege; (3) is made to a person without a proper interest;
or (4) includes defamatory statements unnecessary for the purpose
of the privilege.110
Absolute privilege from defamation liability is granted to
statements: (1) of participants in any stage of judicial or legislative
proceedings (including administrative proceedings such as school
board dismissal hearings);"' (2) by high public officials acting
within scope of their duties; 12 (3) by employers issuing evalua-
106. Beckman v. Dunn, 419 A.2d 583, 587 (Pa. Super. 1980).
107. Elia v. Erie Ins. Exch., 634 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. Super. 1993). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 594(b), 595 (1977).
108. See Geyer v. Steinborn, 506 A.2d 901 (Pa. Super. 1986); Daywalt v. Montgomery
Hosp., 573 A.2d 1116 (Pa. Super. 1990); Deluca v. Ready, 323 A.2d 309 (Pa. Super. 1974);
Pittsburgh, A. & M. Pass. R. Co. v. McCurdy, 8 A. 230 (Pa. 1886); 50 AM. JUR. 2D, Libel and
Slander § 273 (1970).
109. Bums v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 615 F.Supp. 154, 158 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
110. Elia, 634 A.2d at 661. Because employers continue to have liability concerns despite
the substantial protection given employers under current law, legislation has been proposed
which would grant Pennsylvania employers even broader immunity. The legislation would
preclude liability whenever an employer gives information to another prospective employer
in good faith. The protection provided by the legislation is less than that of absolute
privilege, but probably greater than that of conditional privilege, under current common law.
1995 Pa. S.B. No. 579.
111. Massie v. LaPorte, 27 Pa. D. & C.3d 301, 303 (Cumberland Co. 1983).
112. Lindner v. Mollan, 677 A.2d 1194, 1195 (Pa. 1996). See Steffen v. Mainello, 26
Cumb. County 319 (Cumberland Co. 1976) (in which the court considered a school
superintendent a high public official); and Habe v. Fort Cherry Sch. Dist., 786 F. Supp. 1216
(W.D. Pa. 1992) (indicating school superintendents are not automatically entitled to high
official immunity).
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tions, warning letters or termination notices;" 3 or (4) made with
consent of the person who is the subject of the communication.1
4
Absolute privilege applies regardless of truth or motive, including
malice; however, abuse of the privilege still negates protection
when the communication is made to parties without proper interest
in the subject matter."
15
b. Matter of public concern.--Subject matter of legitimate
public concern is another area shielded from defamation liability,
as a matter of both state law and federal constitutional law.
Although this exemption is not well defined under Pennsylvania
law, comment on official conduct of employees deemed to be
"public officials" is clearly protected under the federal Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court established this principle in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"6 reasoning that individuals cannot
be subjected to defamation liability for speaking or releasing
information about public officials; otherwise, the free and open
speech critical to democratic government would be chilled." 7 The
New York Times rule is premised on the First Amendment and
bars public officials, likely including school superintendents and
other administrative employees, l1 ' as well as school board mem-
bers,'1 9 from recovering damages for defamatory comments by
others, even if the facts communicated are false." The only
exception is proof of malice.' 2' In reaching this decision, the
113. Sobel v. Wingard, 531 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. Super. 1987).
114. Johnson v. Resources for Human Dev., Inc., 860 F. Supp. 218, 222 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
115. Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., 483 A.2d 456 (Pa. Super. 1984).
116. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
117. d
118. Another United States Supreme Court decision extended this defamation standard
to public figures as well. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), defined a public
figure as one who commands a substantial amount of public interest by his position alone,
or one who thrusts himself by purposeful activity into the vortex of an important public
controversy. Students, teachers, coaches, principals and other school personnel have been
considered by courts in other jurisdictions to be public figures under certain circumstances.
Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Who Is "Public Figure" For Purposes of Defamation Action,
19 A.L.R.5th 1 (1994).
119. Fegley v. Morthimer, 202 A.2d 125, 126-27 (Pa. Super. 1964).
120. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
121. Fegley, 202 A.2d at 126-27. In the New York Times case, the Court defined actual
malice as making a statement with knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of
whether it is false or not. 376 U.S. at 279-80. Note that if a school official considered a
"high public official" for purposes of "absolute privilege" makes a defamatory comment
regarding another school official, the defamed official may be unable to recover damages as'
a result of absolute privilege under Pennsylvania law, even if there is malice. See supra text
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Court stressed that the First Amendment requires "that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that
it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials."'"
This federal constitutional protection means that public
comment on those attaining the rank of "public official" can occur
with little fear of liability. For example, in the absence of malice,
the New York Times rule has been held to protect accusations
about a school board member implying the board member induced
the district to buy real estate from a friend at an exorbitant
price." Nevertheless, false defamatory criticism of school
officials is not "wide open" in the sense that malice could still
invite a successful legal claim.
c. General municipal immunity.-In addition to the specific
defamation claim defenses available to anyone, government
agencies and employees are given special protection from liability
claims. Under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims
Act,24 school districts and other municipalities are granted
immunity from all liability under state law, except in circumstances
expressly provided for by the Act."z None of the circumstances
accompanying notes 111-15 and infra text accompanying notes 128-34.
122. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270. The protection under the First Amendment
applies not just to comments on "public officials," but also to comment on any matters of
public concern. Without providing clear guidance, the United States Supreme Court has held
that matter of public concern must be "determined by [the expression's] content, form, and
context . . . as revealed by the whole record." Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (5-4 decision) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 147-148 (1983)). In this case, the defendant supplied a false confidential credit rating
report to five subscribers indicating that the plaintiff filed for bankruptcy. The majority held
that the report was not a matter of public concern, but four justices disagreed believing the
definition is broader. Id.
123. Fegley, 202 A.2d at 126-27.
124. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8541-8564 (West 1982).
125. Id. Liability can be imposed against a municipality only under the following
exceptions: (1) damages caused by operation of a motor vehicle; (2) damages to property
belonging to other persons which is in the care, custody or control of the school district or
other local agency; (3) damages to the person or property caused by condition of real estate
in the school district or other local agency's care, custody or control; (4) harm caused by
dangerous condition of traffic controls, street lights, or trees in care, custody or control of
school district or other local agency; (5) harm caused by dangerous condition of utilities
owned by school district or other local agency; (6) harm caused by dangerous condition of
streets owned by school district or other local agency, and sidewalks within rights-of-way of
streets owned by school district or other local agency; or (7) harm caused by animals in care,
custody or control of school district or other local agency. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 8542(b) (West 1982).
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includes defamation, or any other area of possible liability related
to communications regarding employees. As a result, school
districts are immune from all such liability.
The Tort Claims Act also grants immunity to school employees
and officials under the same circumstances, but with the added
exception that immunity is not available when conduct is criminal,
fraudulent, willful, or malicious." This means the door is still
open to defamation liability if an employee can prove that a public
official or employee made a defamatory communication motivated
by malice."27
As mentioned in the discussion of privilege,"2 high public
officials, including certain school officials, are entitled to immunity
from defamation liability, whether or not communications are
motivated by malice.129  In dismissing a defamation suit filed
against a borough mayor arising from the mayor's statement at a
council meeting that the council chairman was "a village idiot" and
had been "dipping into the till," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Lindner v. Mollan 3° ruled that high public official immunity
continues to exist for local agency officials despite the more limited
Tort Claims Act immunity.13' The court decided that the Tort
Claims Act was not intended to abrogate the long standing
Pennsylvania common law rule granting absolute privilege to high
public officials.132 Further, the court held that the high public
official immunity rule provides broader protection than the Tort
Claims Act for those who qualify as high public officials; the only
effect of the Tort Claims Act is to establish the scope of immunity
for political subdivisions and employees not qualifying as high
public officials. 33 The court explained that high public official
immunity is intended to serve society by protecting society's
interest in unfettered discussion of public issues."
126. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8550 (West 1982).
127. See Goralski v. Pizzimenti, 540 A.2d 595 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), in which the court
dismissed a defamation suit by a substitute teacher against her former school district
employer and its business manager based on a termination letter written by the business
manager.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 111-15.
129. See Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc. 483 A.2d 456 (Pa. Super. 1984).
130. 677 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 1996).
131. Md at 1196.
132. I&
133. 1M
134. Id. at 1195-96.
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Tort Claims Act immunity and common law high public official
immunity relate to claims asserted under state law. We discuss
below the possible liability to employees under federal consti-
tutional law.'35 However, school districts and officials also have
immunity against these federal claims. Concerning the liability of
the school district, a local government unit can be held liable for
violation of an individual's constitutional rights, but only where the
injury results from an official policy. Mere indifference or failure
to act is not enough to establish liability of the local government
unit."16 On the other hand, the local government unit is not
immune from liability based solely on the good faith of its
officials.'37 Concerning the liability of school officials, a school
board member is immune from liability unless the member knew
or reasonably should have known that the action taken or omitted
would violate the constitutional rights of the affected individual, or
unless action was taken with malicious intent.' Under the latest
test, the availability of immunity is essentially an objective test.
Government officials are entitled to immunity from liability as long
as conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.
139
d. Prior liability cases.-As shown by this discussion, there
are many defenses to any defamation liability claim based on a
school official's release of personnel information, and liability is
therefore unlikely in most cases. Nevertheless, despite the protec-
tions of truth, conditional privilege, absolute privilege, the public
concern defense, and general municipal immunity, the potential for
litigation and judgments awarding substantial damages remains a
threat to school district officials.
In Zelik v. Daily News Publishing Co."4 a statement made
by a parent and published by a newspaper alleged that a teacher
threw a metal object at one of her students. The court allowed the
teacher's defamation claim, finding the statement capable of
135. See infra notes 180-98 and accompanying text.
136. Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
137. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). See Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
138. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
139. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635
(1987).
140. 431 A.2d 1046 (Pa. Super. 1981).
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defamatory meaning, because a person who would engage in such
conduct is not fit to teach young children.'41 This case empha-
sizes the sensitivity of a teacher's reputation to harmful statements.
Demonstrating the importance of context, the court in Malia
v. Monchak142 held that a board member's criticism of a vice
principal was capable of defamatory meaning. 43 Following a
school board hearing on termination of the vice principal, the board
voted not to terminate. However, a board member after the vote
stated the vice principal was "grossly insubordinate, if not incompe-
tent."1" Concluding that the comment went beyond pure opinion
and alluded to undisclosed facts discussed during the closed
hearing, the court denied the board member's motion to dismiss the
claim.
145
The potential for substantial damages was also shown in a
recent Pennsylvania case, Chestnut v. Pottstown Hill School"6 The
plaintiff, a former private school teacher, was awarded $10,000,000
in punitive damages plus $250,000 in compensatory damages as the
result of defamatory statements by school administrators. 47  In
this case, the jury determined that the school was unable to prove
the truth of comments made by administrators to students and
faculty regarding alleged homosexual advances toward students by
the former teacher. 14
Another jury awarded an employee $1,400,000 in punitive
damages plus $90,000 in compensatory damages against a super-
visor who informed coworkers at a meeting that the employee was
dismissed for stealing a bag of potato chips.149  In Rue v. Kmart
141. Id. at 1048-49.
142. 543 A.2d 184 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
143. Id. at 191.
144. Id.
145. The Malia case involved defamation claims against several school officials, including
the principal, superintendent, school board, and individual members of the school board. Id.
at 186. The court extended official immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act
and dismissed all claims except as to the one board member who made the statement and
who was found by the trial court to have been acting outside the scope of his duties as a
school director because of the timing of the statement. The finding that the board member
was not acting within the scope of the duties was uncontested on appeal. Id. at 190-91.
146. Phila. Com. Pleas No. 01-92-4581 (Jan. 8, 1995).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Rue v. Kmart Corp. 1996 WL 313416 (Pa. Super. June 12, 1996) (opinion vacated).
Case heard by Superior Court en banc with a decision pending.
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Corp.,150 the court ruled that findings of the unemployment
compensation board which cleared the employee were binding and
prevented Kmart and the supervisor from proving the statements
were true.151  The court also concluded the evidence was suf-
ficient for the jury to find that Kmart failed to exercise due care in
verifying the truth of the information before communicating it to
other employees.
Although none of these cases upheld liability of a school
district or school official acting within the scope of official duties,
they demonstrate the propensity of employees for litigation and the
readiness of juries to deliver substantial verdicts. Considering that
privilege or immunity defenses might be defeated by claims of
malice and the significant burden and expense entailed even in
defending against groundless litigation, school officials must take
defamation concerns seriously when dealing with employees.152
150. 1996 WL 313416 (Pa. Super. June 12, 1996).
151. Id.
152. We have been focusing on defamation liability under state law. Arguments have
been made in numerous cases that dissemination of false information, without a prior
hearing, can also create liability under federal law for deprivation of liberty without due
process. For example, in Homar v. Gilbert, 89 F.3d 1009 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117
S. Ct. 678 (1997), where a police officer was suspended and later demoted, without a prior
hearing, for alleged drug involvement, the officer claimed his due process liberty interest was
violated by the demotion and the employer's release to a newspaper of information
concerning its investigation and the ultimate demotion. He claimed the demotion and
release of defamatory information without a prior hearing deprived him of liberty without
due process of law. Relying on Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 546 at 573, the Gilbert
court acknowledged that due process might require a hearing where a government body
takes disciplinary action and disseminates defamatory information about the action, but
rejected the employee's claim, reasoning that an employee may prevail on this theory only
if the employee can demonstrate that the government disseminated false information. Very
importantly, however, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that defamatory
statements alone, without more, are not enough to trigger a due process hearing right; there
,must also be some disciplinary action taken against the employee. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 708 (1976). See also Hershinow v. Bonamarte, 735 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1984). Whether
release of information combined with disciplinary action will trigger a due process hearing
right will generally not be an issue for Pennsylvania school districts, because the School Code
and Local Agency Law already require that school districts hold a hearing for most
disciplinary actions. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1129, 5-514 (West 1992); 2 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 553 (West 1995). If an employee is dismissed or disciplined, the hearing
required by state law should suffice to satisfy any due process requirement. Similarly, this
will not be an issue if an employee resigns, because under Paul v. Davis in the absence of
disciplinary action, there will be no deprivation of liberty interest sufficient to create a due
process claim, and consequently any employee claim based on release of information will
have to be based on state privacy or defamation law.
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2. Privacy liability concerns. -Defamation is not the only
liability concern; personal privacy is also protected by state and
federal law. "The right to privacy is one of the most closely
guarded treasures of our society. It is characterized as an indi-
vidual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."1 53
Releasing personnel information to the public, during a school
board meeting or otherwise, could subject school officials to
liability for infringing an employee's legal privacy rights.
a. Common law privacy rights.-A common law right to
privacy has been established in Pennsylvania, allowing personal
injury claims for invasion of privacy." Based on the Restatement
of Torts 55 and articulated in Vogel v. WT Grant Co.,156 a tor-
tious invasion of privacy involves any one of four actions:
(a) Unreasonable intrusion upon a person's seclusion;
157
(b) Appropriation of a person's name or likeness;
158
(c) Unreasonable publicity of a person's private life;159 or
(d) Publicity that places someone in a false light.16
153. Tribune-Review, 662 A.2d at 681.
154. For a discussion of immunity of school districts and school employees under the
Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, see supra Part One I.F.1. The provisions
of this Act also provide immunity against employee liability claims based on the invasion of
privacy under Pennsylvania common law.
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-852E (1977).
156. 327 A.2d 133 (Pa. 1974).
157. Id. at 136 n.9. See Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 866 F. Supp. 190 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(holding that employer violated employee's privacy through opening of personal letters ad-
dressed to workplace which related to employee's HIV infection); Rogers v. Int'l Business
Machines Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that employee's privacy rights
were not violated by employer's investigation consisting of interviews of full-time staff and
examination of company records).
158. Vogel, 327 A.2d 133, 136 n.9. See Fogel v. Forbes, 500 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(finding no liability in use of plaintiff's photograph to illustrate article).
159. See Vogel, 327 A.2d 133, 136 n.9 (articulating the four causes of action for invasion
of privacy, but finding no invasion for unreasonable publicity by publication to only four
people); Harris by Harris v. Easton Publishing Co., 483 A.2d 1377 (Pa. Super. 1984) (finding
testimony of seventeen people identifying plaintiff as the subject of newspaper article
sufficient to prove there was "publicity" about the plaintiff).
160. Vogel, 327 A.2d 133, 136 n.9. See Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 154 A.2d 422 (Pa. Super.
1959)(newspaper published article which fictionalized and embellished facts of woman's
marriage and divorce including facts about woman's parents, and the newspaper was held
liable for going beyond limits of decency and invading the privacy of the woman's parents).
See also the following cases in which employees attempted, but were unsuccessful in
establishing false light invasion of privacy claims against their employers: Martin v.
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The third legal action, unreasonable publicity of a person's
private life, has generated considerable employee litigation. 6'
A valid claim requires evidence of: (1) publicity, given to (2)
private facts (3) which would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (4) which is not of legitimate concern to the public."6
"Publicity" in this context refers to communication to the public at
large;'" a "private fact" is one which is not already known by or
available to the public;"6 "highly offensive publicity" would
"outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a
person of ordinary sensibilities;"'" and "legitimate public con-
cern" has been broadly interpreted to include most newsworthy
information, including private facts about voluntary or involuntary
public figures.' 66 In addition, to establish liability the person
contending a privacy invasion must show that he or she was
personally identified in the improper publicity.167
A tortious invasion of privacy by unreasonable publicity
generally requires widespread dissemination of a private fact,"6
and plaintiffs may have less difficulty proving this element in cases
against publishing companies and the media. However, this claim
has also been asserted against employers, for instance, based on
dissemination of the reason for an employee's dismissal, the results
of a performance evaluation, or facts about an employee's medical
condition. 69 But employee-plaintiffs in Pennsylvania have been
generally unsuccessful. For example, in Wells v. Thomas7 ° an
employer's release of details contained in a former employee's
Municipal Publications, 510 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Curran v. Children's Service
Center, Inc. 578 A.2d 8 (Pa. Super. 1990); Kryeski v. Schott Glass Technologies, 626 A.2d
595 (Pa. Super. 1993); Parano v. O'Conner, 641 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super. 1994).
161. Employers should be aware of all four causes of action for invasion of privacy,
although the publication of private facts is most relevant to the question of confidentiality
requirements.
162. See Harris by Harris, 483 A.2d at 1384; Jenkins v. Bolla, 600 A.2d 1293 (Pa. Super.
1992).
163. Harris by Harris, 483 A.2d at 1384; Vogel, 327 A.2d at 137. See also Chicarella v.
Passant, 494 A.2d 1109 (Pa. Super. 1985); Jenkins v. Bolla, 600 A.2d 1293 (Pa. Super. 1992).
164. Harris by Harris, 483 A.2d at 1384.
165. Id. at 1385. See Nagy v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 436 A.2d 701 (Pa. Super. 1981).
166. Harris by Harris, 483 A.2d at 1385. See Santillo v. Reedel, 634 A.2d 264 (Pa. Super.
1993) (holding past allegations of sexual abuse by candidate for district justice were of
legitimate public concern).
167. Harris by Harris, 483 A.2d at 1385.
168. Id. at 1384.
169. 82 AM. JuI. 2D, Wrongful Discharge § 170 (1964).
170. 569 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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employment separation settlement agreement to other employees
during a staff meeting did not constitute "publicity" and was not
"highly offensive."
171
Jurisdictions outside Pennsylvania have reached different
conclusions when faced with employee privacy violation claims. 72
A federal appeals court in McSurely v. McClellan, also basing
its decision on the Restatement of Torts,74 upheld the validity of
an unreasonable publicity claim despite the lack of widespread
publicity of facts.1 75  In this case, the court cited Michigan case
law which indicates that non-public figures may recover for privacy
invasions when facts are disclosed to a more specialized "public,"
such as fellow employees.'76
While the legal interpretation of "publicity" under McSurely
is not consistent with existing Pennsylvania cases, our courts have
acknowledged a right to be free from unwarranted and undesired
publicity."7 Although Pennsylvania has required a high level of
publicity,178  a school employee might assert a privacy claim
against a school district or school official if private facts are
discussed during a school board meeting or disclosed to the media.
This kind of publicity goes beyond discussion with other employees
as in Wells and, depending on the circumstances, might be
considered unreasonable publicity justifying a privacy violation
liability claim even under Pennsylvania's narrow interpretation. Of
course, if Pennsylvania courts were to follow the McSurely
171. Id. at 437. Additional cases involving employee-plaintiffs include Curran v.
Children's Service Center of Wyoming County, Inc., 578 A.2d 8 (Pa. Super. 1990); Kryeski
v. Schott Glass Technologies, Inc., 626 A.2d 595 (Pa. Super. 1993).
172. See Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1990) (where
employee brought a privacy action seeking damages resulting from her employer's disclosure
of her mastectomy surgery to her coworkers and court held that (1) employee's pleadings
stated a cause of action for public disclosure of private facts, and (2) employee failed to state
a claim for unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion of another). See also Beaumont v. Brown,
257 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 1977).
173. 753 F.2d 88 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
174. In federal court, under the District of Columbia's choice of laws rule, Kentucky law
governed the common law violation of privacy claim. Id. at 109-10. Kentucky has adopted
the Restatement (Second) of Torts for analysis of privacy torts. Id. at 109-12.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 112 (citing Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 1977)).
177. Vogel, 327 A.2d 133; Harris by Harris, 483 A.2d 1377; Hamson v. World Life &
Health Ins. Co. of Pa., 63 Del. County 322 (Pa. C.P. 1976); Lutz v. Brookline Savings &
Trust Co., 117 Pittsburgh Legal Journal 239 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny Co. 1969).
178. Wells, 569 F. Supp. 426.
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reasoning, liability might occur even in cases of more limited
disclosure.
In many cases, it is difficult to know whether personnel facts
are a legitimate public concern. At one end of the spectrum, an
undisputed theft of public funds is certainly a proper public
concern; at the other end, simple poor performance or disputed
incompetency likely are not. In between, there is room for
argument. The bottom line is that disclosure of personnel
information could subject school officials to invasion of privacy
liability-the risk being greater if information not of legitimate
public concern reaches the general public and there are claims of
malice. 79
b. Constitutional privacy rights.-Public employees have
additional privacy protection under the federal Constitution, which
is generally not applicable to private employer actions. Privacy is
a fundamental constitutional right recognized under several United
States Supreme Court rulings. The Supreme Court has attributed
the privacy right to various derivations, including the first, third,
fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments, and has applied this
right in many different circumstances, including contraception,' 8°
maternity leave regulations, 181 abortion, 182 searches" and col-
lection of personal information.1" As government entities, school
districts must observe the constitutional privacy rights of school
employees, which generally may be limited only by means reason-
ably calculated to serve a legitimate government interest."l
Overturning a federal district court decision, the Third Circuit
in Doe v. SEPTA186 recently found no violation of an employee's
179. Regarding school district and employee immunity under the Pennsylvania Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act, see supra Part One I.F.1.
180. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
181. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
182. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
183. New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
184. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
185. The constitutional test applied by a court will vary depending upon the degree of
the invasion of privacy. If the intrusion is severe, the government must prove it has a
"compelling interest." However, if the invasion is less than severe, the court will apply a
lower standard of review by balancing the competing interests. Doe v. SEPTA, 72 F.3d 1133,
1139-40 (3d Cir. 1995). The Pennsylvania Constitution also guarantees a right of privacy in
Article I, § 1. See Tribune-Review, 662 A.2d at 681; Denoncourt v. Commonwealth State
Ethics Comm'n, 470 A.2d 945, 948 (Pa. 1983).
186. 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995).
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privacy rights under a § 1983 claim against the Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority and its chief administrative
officer. The alleged violation resulted from the officer's discovery
of the employee's HIV infection while reviewing prescription medi-
cation records in connection with a cost analysis of the Authority's
self-insurance plan,"8 and the officer's subsequent disclosure to
other Authority officials."8 The court ruled that a fundamental
constitutional privacy right applies to employee medical prescrip-
tion records,1" but that the intrusion in this case was minimal,1"
and the right must be balanced against the strong public interest in
containing government agency expenses.' 91 Balancing the com-
peting interests, the court found disclosure of the employee's name
and condition to additional Authority officials was necessary and
proper."9 The SEPTA case denied the liability claim, but estab-
lishes that liability is possible and illustrates the sort of disclosure
for which a public official might be held liable under an employee
claim for violation of constitutional privacy rights."9
Paul v. Davis194 is another case which has addressed the
constitutional right of privacy in connection with the public release
of information. In this case, the plaintiff had been arrested for
shoplifting and his name and picture were included in a police
"active shoplifters" flier distributed to merchants.195  Plaintiff
claimed the preparation and distribution of the flier violated his
constitutional privacy rights.' 96  Although acknowledging the
constitutional right of privacy, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that this right does not extend so far as to preclude the state
from publicizing a record of an official action."9 As indicated in
the SEPTA case, however, a different result might result from
disclosure of information which is something other than an official
action.
187. Id. at 1135-36.
188. Id. at 1136.
189. Id. at 1138.
190. Id. at 1140. The employee suffered no economic loss, discrimination, or harassment
as a result of the disclosure. Id.
191. Doe v. SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1140.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
195. Id. at 695.
196. Id. at 712.
197. Id at 713.
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Aside from the success or failure of any particular case, the
constitutional status extended by the Supreme Court to the right of
privacy underlines the importance of privacy considerations in
developing a policy for regulation of employee information.
The conclusion to be drawn from the cases on common law
and constitutional privacy rights is that school districts and school
officials could incur liability from unnecessary publicity of person-
nel information. However, the law provides substantial de-
fenses,198 and caution should prevent any serious liability concern.
3. Balancing public policy and liability concerns-The proper
response.-We have now moved from one extreme to the other.
Our analysis started with various open government statutes pushing
towards release of information. We retreated with the many
exceptions built into these statutes. Now we have observed that
release of information can create monetary liability. Where does
this leave us? Should school officials simply establish a policy of
never releasing information about employees unless the law
mandates otherwise?
In fact, fearing defamation or privacy claims, frivolous or not,
many employers have policies essentially precluding discussion of
current or former employees with anyone, including other potential
employers, and strictly limiting release of employee information to
verifying dates of employment. Although many employers have
adopted this type of extremely restrictive policy on releasing
information, there are good reasons to consider more expansive
and flexible policies.
Particularly in responding to employment reference requests,
schools should consider the wisdom of providing all relevant
information. Having a system where employers openly provide
complete past and current employment information is important to
effective school hiring decisions, and, as will be seen later, may
even be essential to avoid liability. Selecting qualified, responsible
and effective teachers to educate students and administrators to
oversee the educational process is an essential and critically
important school district duty. Schools also hire and delegate
significant responsibility to many non-professional employees.
198. In addition to the discussion in Part One I.F.2, see supra notes 105-39 and
accompanying text.
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Schools need reliable information in making these important
decisions.
Certain limited information is available from the Professional
Standards and Practice Commission relating to formal discipline of
a professional employee. But schools must rely primarily on
interviews, credentials supplied by applicants and employment
references when making hiring decisions.
Employment references supplied by current or former
employers often present the most meaningful indication of an
applicant's character and abilities. Without receiving complete
information from prior employers, a new employer is at substantial
risk of making a bad hiring decision, either hiring a bad employee
or failing to hire an outstanding person. Open communication
between employers promotes recognition of employee achieve-
ments and accountability for misconduct.
Again and again schools face situations where bad employees,
including teachers, administrators and nonprofessional employees,
perform poorly, create serious problems, or even engage in criminal
misconduct in one school district, then end up employed in another
school district only to repeat the same course of conduct. This
frequently occurs because the first employer refuses to give any
reference information, or worse yet gives the employee a clean bill
of health, either out of fear of liability or based on a desire to pass
a problem on to another employer. The employee's problems with
the prior employer are often uncovered only as a result of an
investigation growing out of the repeated misconduct with the new
employer. This often recurring pattern creates serious problems for
school districts and other employers, and shows the need for
complete and candid employment references.
Employers should seriously consider employment reference
policies allowing full disclosure. As we have seen, the law provides
employers substantial protection against defamation or privacy
liability.1" Factual statements by an employer, even if harmful
to an employee's reputation, will not create liability when properly
communicated as part of a job reference.
In deciding on employment reference disclosure policies,
schools need to consider the importance of effective hiring systems
and the possibility of future harm to students, faculty or the general
public, based on repetition of past misconduct, if employment
199. See supra Part One I.F.1, 2.
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information is suppressed. Is there an obligation, indeed an ethical
obligation, to disclose employee misconduct or substandard
performance to potential future employers in order to provide an
effective school system and to protect students?
Schools also need to consider the potential for liability in not
disclosing employment information. As discussed in the next
section of this article, two recent federal court decisions indicate
that withholding misconduct information can subject a school
district to liability if the employee later harms someone." The
facts of these cases tragically demonstrate the potential danger of
overly restrictive disclosure policies.
Going a step further, the policies underlying Pennsylvania's
open government laws, and other non-legal considerations discussed
below, 1 may at times argue strongly for release of information
also to audiences other than potential employers.
To reconcile the policy considerations with potential liability,
employers should consider a possible middle ground. No doubt
defamation and privacy litigation give employers strong reason to
keep personnel information in confidence. Yet it is possible for
employers to reconcile liability concerns with the need for open
communications. In order to avoid employee liability claims and
balance the competing forces, school officials could adopt a policy
of discussing personnel information only with others having a
proper interest and need to know. This includes other employers.
It normally will not, but at times might, include the general public.
In all events, information should be strictly limited to verified facts
and opinions based on facts. Information should always be com-
municated in an objective and unemotional manner to avoid any
inference of malice. In addition, response to reference requests
and other employee information release should be made exclusively
by designated school officials trained to understand the proper
limits on disclosure, such as the superintendent, business manager
or personnel manager.2" Despite the complexity of defamation
200. See infra Part One I.G.
201. See infra Part One II.B.
202. For additional liability protection, districts can include language in employment
applications and employee handbooks specifying that, as a condition of employment, the
employee authorizes the employer to release information. This would include release to
individuals, companies or organizations requesting information in connection with a job
application or credit check. Also disclosure to others when the district determines that it is
necessary or appropriate because of its status as a government body. Further that the
employee releases the employer from any liability arising out of such a disclosure. We have
[Vol. 101:2
1997] CONFIDENTIALITY OF SCHOOL PERSONNEL MATrERS 365
and privacy law, an analysis of applicable law shows these simple
precautions would allow school officials to both have an open
information policy and also avert the pitfalls of potential liability.
G. Monetary Liability for Failure to Disclose
Yet another force militates in favor of disclosure-monetary
liability. A school district may have an obligation to disclose
information for the protection of students. In addition to obvious
moral responsibilities to disclose, two recent federal court deci-
sionsm have established the validity of liability claims brought
under § 1983 of the United States Code' against school districts
and school officials whose concealment of sexual abuse by teachers
facilitated continued or subsequent student abuse.
1. Section 1983.--One of the most serious examples of school
employee misconduct is sexual abuse of students. While sexual
abuse has many legal ramifications for the perpetrator, a lawsuit
based on violation of the student's civil rights can implicate the
school district and school officials as well.
Under federal law, an individual may bring a civil rights action
against "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to
been talking about disclosure of personnel information from one employer to a new
prospective employer, and the impact disclosure or nondisclosure may have on the new
employer and potentially students and others. Of course, the new employer can also take
steps to try to ensure disclosure, if not by the former employer, then by the employee. For
this purpose, employment applications should include questions designed to elicit information
about problems at prior employment. With respect to teachers, School Code Section 1204.1,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1204.1 (West Supp. 1996), mandates the Pennsylvania Secretary of
Education to develop a standard form application. Pursuant to this mandate, the Secretary
of Education has promulgated a standard form. The standard form asks the applicant
whether the applicant has been fired from a prior job or quit a job after being notified the
applicant would be fired. As permitted by School Code Section 1204.1, school districts
should ask additional questions on the employment application. The standard form question
is not sufficient, particularly considering that a decision on dismissal can only be made by a
school board after a hearing. In order to ensure employers hear from applicants about
employment problems where there was no hearing, additional questions should be asked as
to whether the employee ever quit to avoid disciplinary proceedings, or after having been
notified of a negative evaluation or allegations of misconduct or poor performance.
Similarly, consideration should be given to asking questions about prior child abuse or
harassment allegations. These questions should be asked of applicants for both professional
and nonprofessional positions.
203. Doe v. Methacton Sch. Dist., 880 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Stoneking v.
Bradford Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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be subjected, any citizen ... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."'
Under § 1983, a public entity may be held liable when a govern-
mental policy or custom, whether formally adopted or informally
but uniformly adhered to, violates a constitutional right and leads
to injury.2°  Courts have established that sexual abuse can be
considered a violation of a person's right to freedom from invasion
of personal security which is protected from governmental interfer-
ence by the due process clause of the federal Constitution.'
Further, a school district can incur § 1983 liability if a school policy
somehow facilitates sexual abuse.'
2. Doe v. Methacton School District.-The decision in Doe v.
Methacton School District' suggests that school districts have a
duty to disclose abusive employee misconduct to potential or future
employers in order to avoid concealing the abuse and thereby
creating a policy of reckless indifference to the safety and constitu-
tional rights of students in a school district that later employs the
same person.21°
Methacton I involved a Methacton School District music
teacher who began a romantic and physical relationship with a
twelve year old student.2 1 After three years the relationship was
discovered by the girl's parents, who reported the relationship to
the vice principal, who in turn informed the principal.212 Over
several months and after repeated warnings, the relationship
continued until the principal and superintendent confronted the
teacher about a particular incident and the teacher admitted that
the incident occurred. 3  The superintendent and principal
presented the teacher with a proposed letter of resignation
indicating resignation because of "personal reasons" and informed
the teacher that he could avoid an investigation and suspension if
he resigned.21 4  The teacher resigned, and thereafter applied to
205. Id.
206. Rucker v. Martin, 505 F. Supp. 20, 23 (D. Okla. 1980).
207. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 726-27.
208. Id. at 730.
209. 880 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (hereinafter Methacton 1).
210. Id. at 384, 385.
211. Id. at 382.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 382-83.
[Vol. 101:2
1997] CONFIDENTIALITY OF SCHOOL PERSONNEL MATTERS 367
the Philadelphia School District for a similar teaching position.215
When contacted for a recommendation, Methacton School District
commented that the teacher's service had been "satisfactory"; and
the Philadelphia School District hired the teacher.216 Baby Doe,
a nine year old student at Philadelphia School District, was sexually
abused by the teacher fourteen years later.21 7 The teacher
subsequently pleaded guilty to various crimes, including involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse.218
The district court found that the Methacton School District
could be viewed as establishing a governmental policy condoning
sexual abuse, in deliberate indifference to Baby Doe's consti-
tutional rights, 219 by allowing the teacher to resign for personal
reasons, by giving the teacher a satisfactory recommendation when
requested by Philadelphia School District, and by failing to report
the sexual abuse to Children and Youth Services.' ° Therefore,
the district court denied motions by Methacton and three school
officials to dismiss the liability claims asserted by Baby Doe.221
The court ruled that if Baby Doe could prove that a policy of
nondisclosure led to the subsequent sexual abuse, the school district
and school officials could be held liable for deprivation of her civil
rights and negligence.2' Although a later decision in the same
215. Methacton I, 880 F. Supp. at 383.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 382.
219. Id. at 384, 385.
220. The plaintiff alleged that a statutory duty existed in 1979 to report child abuse to
Children and Youth Services pursuant to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2204 (West 1975)
(repealed, now 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6311 (West Supp. 1996)). Methacton , 880 F.
Supp. at 383 n.1.
221. Methacton I, 880 F. Supp. at 385, 388. The Methacton defendants' motions to
dismiss were granted as to the student's claim under § 1983 which alleged that the defendants
owed Baby Doe "an affirmative duty to protect her against abusive conduct by public school
teachers and to provide for her safety and well-being under the state-created danger
doctrine." Id. at 385-86. The district court held that the defendants were not aware that
they had created a danger specifically to Baby Doe, and could not be held liable under the
state-created danger doctrine where the victim was not known and identified. Id at 386.
In addition, factors such as the defendants' control or custody of the wrongdoer, temporal
proximity, or affirmative placement of the wrongdoer in the position to do the wrong, were
not present. Id.
222. Id. at 385. The district court also considered Methacton's motion to dismiss the
claim of negligence. Id at 386. The negligence claim was based on allegations that the three
individual Methacton School District officials had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the
performance of their responsibilities as government employees and breached that duty
thereby causing harm to Baby Doe. Id. The court allowed the plaintiff to assert the claim
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case ruled that Methacton School District's nondisclosure could not
be the cause of the later sexual abuse because of the fourteen-year
time span,21 Methacton I is a strong indication that school dis-
tricts must consider carefully a decision which permits an offender
to resign and covers the offender's tracks.
3. Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District.-Stoneking v.
Bradford Area School District24 served as a precedent for the
Methacton I decision.' Methacton I involved an alleged cover-
up of abuse by school officials which was established in part by a
satisfactory employment reference given after the teacher's resigna-
tion.22  In contrast, the school officials in Stoneking never termi-
nated or requested the resignation of the abusive teacher.2'
Instead, the school officials allegedly concealed the abuse, thereby
acting in reckless indifference to student rights and safety.22
Between 1978 and 1982, school officials at the Bradford Area
School District received at least five complaints by female students
alleging incidents of sexual assault by teachers and staff mem-
bers. 229 Despite the contentions of abuse, no records of the
complaints were made in the employees' official files; and all of the
teachers received perfect or excellent performance evaluations.'
and found that the defendants were not immune from liability under the Pennsylvania
Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8541-8564 (West 1982),
because the claim was brought against the defendants as individuals, not in their official
capacities. Id. at 387. For a discussion of the Tort Claims Act, see supra Part One I.F.1.
223. Doe v. Methacton Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 101, 103 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Similar cases
have been decided in other jurisdictions. For example, in Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified
Sch. Dist., Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 20, at A-1 (Cal. Jan 30, 1997), the California
Supreme Court ruled that a school employer can be liable for misrepresenting a former
school employee's character. In this case, a vice principal allegedly sexually molested a
thirteen year old girl. The girl sued Muroc Joint Unified School District and school officials
who wrote letters of recommendation on behalf of the vice principal. She alleged the letters
omitted information about prior sexual misconduct complaints against the vice principal while
at Muroc, and as a result the vice principal was hired by the school district where the girl was
molested. In reversing the trial court's dismissal of the claims, the California Supreme Court
held that a writer of a letter of recommendation owes prospective employers and third
persons a duty not to misrepresent facts if the misrepresentations could present a foreseeable
risk of injury to the employer or third persons.
224. 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989).
225. See Methacton 1, 880 F. Supp. at 383-84.
226. Id. at 382.
227. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 722.
228. Id. at 724-25.
229. Id. at 728-29.
230. Id. at 729.
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Ms. Stoneking, who did not report her abuse to school officials,
alleged that the band director used physical force, threats of
reprisal, intimidation and coercion to sexually abuse and to harass
her throughout her high school years.23 The reason that Mrs.
Stoneking did not report the abuse was because another female
student had reported sexual assault by the band director, but was
forced by the school officials either to withdraw from all band
activities or to recant and formally apologize to the teacher and the
band for her statements.3 2  Similar testimony of other students
indicated that school officials routinely discouraged or intimidated
students who filed sexual harassment complaints.
233
The Third Circuit ruled in Stoneking that a jury could construe
the school officials' actions of discouraging and concealing com-
plaints of sexual abuse as a practice, custom or policy in reckless
indifference to students' civil rights.' Furthermore, the court
held that sufficient evidence was set forth to prove a causal link
between the actions of school officials and the abuse of Ms.
Stoneking since the actions encouraged an environment where
students were victimized by teachers.25
4. End result-Liability if serious misconduct is not dis-
closed.-The idea of a school district intentionally operating under
a policy, practice or custom condoning sexual abuse of students
seems implausible. Nonetheless, two federal courts have held that
the alleged school district procedures in Methacton and Stoneking
were sufficient to be considered policy, practice or custom. These
decisions indicate the existence of an affirmative duty on school
officials to protect students and establish legal precedent for
holding school districts liable for failure to disclose abuse and take
proper action against offenders. The bottom line is that school
officials must acknowledge that an employee who commits abuse
231. Id. at 722.
232. Id. at 728.
233. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 728.
234. Id. at 730-31.
235. Id. at 731. There are numerous cases in other jurisdictions indicating school districts
or school officials may be held liable for failure to act in the face of complaints of student
abuse or sexual harassment. See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor Independent Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th
Cir. 1994); Jane Doe A. v. Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1990); Gates v. Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 449, 996 F.2d 1035 (10th Cir. 1993). While the focus of this article is on
disclosure, not liability for failure to investigate or act, the two are related as indicated by
the Methacton decision.
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may abuse again, and take into account the safety of students and
their legal right to be free from invasions of personal security.
School officials must take care to avoid any course of action
which, by maintaining confidentiality, might facilitate later abuse of
students. Methacton I and Stoneking demonstrate that a substantial
risk of liability exists in failing to investigate student complaints,
not reporting abuse to the Department of Education and the
designated school district "child protective services administrator,"
omitting reports of abuse from an employee personnel file, allowing
an employee to resign rather than face dismissal charges, or not
disclosing misconduct to potential employers when references are
requested. Failure to act or disclose information under these
circumstances may create a danger to students and school district
monetary liability.
H. Possible Invalidation of Employee Discipline Through Public
Disclosure
As discussed above and in Section II, a number of reasons
exist to disclose personnel information. However, maintaining the
integrity and validity of disciplinary proceedings may cut the other
way and necessitate substantial restrictions on publicity prior to a
heating. School employees who contest dismissal or certain other
disciplinary actions are entitled to a due process hearing at which
the school board serves as the jury. 6 To assure a fair hearing
and compliance with due process, any information provided to the
board before a hearing must be limited so that the board can enter
the hearing free of bias. 7
Disclosure of information to the public prior to a hearing
obviously would involve providing information to the school board
which would present a risk of tainting the hearing in violation of
due process requirements. In Coover v. Saucon Valley School Dis-
trict,238 the attorney responsible for prosecuting the case made a
statement to a newspaper prior to the school board hearing which
was scheduled to determine whether a superintendent should be
dismissed. 9 The newspaper release included derogatory state-
236. For a more detailed explanation, see supra Part Two IV.
237. For a more detailed discussion, see supra Part Two IV. See generally, Coover v.
Saucon Valley Sch. Dist., No. 1995-C-9226 (Northampton Co. July 10, 1996).
238. No. 1995-C-9226 (Northampton Co. July 10, 1996).
239. Id. (involving a tainted school board hearing)
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ments about the superintendent.m As a result of this statement
and other irregularities, the Northampton County Court of
Common Pleas overturned the dismissal, specifically finding that
the board hearings were tainted by the attorney's remarks to the
newspaper."41
The Coover case and general due process requirements
mandate severe restrictions on any pre-hearing disclosure of
information. Schools must follow rules similar to police and
prosecutor standards in criminal cases where improper pre-trial
publicity can taint a criminal trial. At times, the rules will place
school officials in a very frustrating position because of high public
interest in a personnel situation, or possibly because the employee
makes inaccurate or untrue statements to the public. Nevertheless,
to ensure the integrity of disciplinary proceedings and to avoid
judicial reversal of otherwise proper school board actions, school
officials must withhold information prior to a disciplinary hearing.
L Student Information Privacy Concerns
Perhaps surprisingly, student privacy rights might preclude the
release of certain personnel information. Federal and state law
expressly protects the confidentiality of information contained in
student records.242 As a result, student legal rights could be
violated by discussing employee misconduct or discipline in cases
where the misconduct involves a student. School officials must
observe student privacy rights and treat employee matters involving
students in a confidential manner, whether or not the student
information is a specific component of a written record.
Under the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
("FERPA"), 243  personally identifiable information from an
"educational record"'  may be released only to: (1) "eligible
students," (2) parents, (3) school officials with legitimate interest,
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5945 (West Supp. 1996);
22 PA. CODE §§ 12.31-12.33 (1990).
243. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; Family Educational Rights and Privacy Rules, 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.1-
99.65 (1996).
244. Under federal law, "record" is defined as information recorded in any way.
"Educational records," that must be made available for inspection by eligible students and
parents and that may not be disclosed except to specified parties, are defined as records
directly related to a student which are maintained by an educational agency or institution or
a party acting for the agency or institution. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3.
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(4) certain government officials, (5) officials of institutions at which
the student intends to enroll, and (6) for financial aid purposes.245
State regulations also specify categorization, rules of access and
procedures for handling educational records.2" School officials
that have access to educational records may not disclose any
information to another party without the consent of an eligible
student or parent.247
What if a student was involved in employee misconduct and
the facts are included in the student record? Such a situation is
possible if a teacher has sexually abused or become involved with
a student. Is there a violation of the student's rights if the facts of
the situation are disclosed to the public in connection with
employee discipline?
While no cases exist regarding a student's rights as to disclo-
sure of information in the above situation, schools must be sensitive
to this issue and avoid potential liability for violating a student's
rights. Logic would not preclude use of such information in a
private personnel hearing, but suggests that student information
generally should not be disclosed or released in any manner
unnecessary for legal proceedings or compliance with legal
mandates. Moreover, the fact that information is disclosed
verbally, rather than by disclosing the actual written student record,
undoubtedly would not be a good defense.2"
Nor should school districts feel secure in disclosing student
information simply because it is not actually recorded in writing in
a student file. Once again, although there are no court decisions
on this point, the logical extension of the public policy favoring the
protection of student records indicates a liability risk in disclosing
information which could be, but is not, recorded in the student file.
245. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31.
246. 22 PA. CODE § 12.31.
247. 34 C.F.R. § 99.33. See also 22 PA. CODE § 12.31-12.33 (Pennsylvania regulations
regarding student records). In addition to the general protection of student records, more
specific protections of student information exist. For example, if a student confides to a
school psychologist, psychiatrist, guidance counselor, school nurse or certain other specified
school employees, the employee is precluded from disclosing the information generally or
in a legal proceeding, unless required by the Child Protective Services Law or necessary to
protect the student's welfare. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5945 (West Supp. 1996); 22 PA.
CODE § 12.12.
248. See MICHAEL I. LEVIN, PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL PERSONNEL ACTIONS § 4.02(G)(3)
(3d ed. 1996) (discussing the use of information learned from students).
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The federal and state privacy protections are intended to
severely limit the flow of information regarding students. Acknowl-
edging this protective purpose, school officials should practice
extreme care when dealing with personnel issues linked to
particular students.
J. Employee Contractual Rights
Contractual obligations also might impact a decision to release
information. School districts often assume additional confidentiality
obligations through execution of employment contracts, collective
bargaining agreements or employee discipline settlement agree-
ments. For example, a superintendent contract might contain a
provision limiting the right of board members to reveal discussions
or results of the superintendent's performance assessment.249
Similarly, collective bargaining agreements sometimes restrict
attendance at grievance hearings to parties with a direct interest in
the dispute, or mandate confidentiality of employee evaluations.
As distinguished from employment and labor contracts,
settlement agreements usually are executed following specific
misconduct allegations. As a result, confidentiality frequently
becomes a major concern for the employee, and often is demanded
by the employee or union in return for conceding to discipline or
to a resignation. While school districts normally react with strong
opposition to confidentiality provisions, in some cases the public
interest is more effectively served through prompt resolution of the
issue.' In return for the employee's agreement to discipline or
resignation, and release of all rights to legal action by the emp-
loyee, school districts sometimes agree to: (1) complete nondis-
closure; (2) disclosure only of agreed information; (3) nondisclosure
of terms and conditions of the settlement agreement; (4) nondis-
closure specifically to the press or the public, while allowing
disclosure as necessary for legal proceedings or fulfillment of school
district responsibilities; (5) the substance of employment references
to be supplied to prospective employers; (6) the procedure or
location for storage of confidential documents and employment
records; or (7) not file or encourage any other party to file a report
249. Such provision is a part of the Pennsylvania Association of School Administrators
(PASA) standard form contract made available by the PASA for use by school districts and
superintendents.
250. See infra Part One II.A.3.
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to the Department of Education or Pennsylvania Professional
Standards and Practices Commission.
School districts generally are best advised to avoid any
contractual restrictions on the right to disclose information. The
wiser course is to have a general policy of confidentiality, subject
to discretion of designated officials but without agreeing to
contractual limitations. Such a policy protects employees yet allows
room for flexibility in deciding the proper amount of disclosure in
any situation. Thus, schools can fulfill any legally required
disclosure obligations as well as any perceived non-legal duty.
As a practical matter, there may be times when a school finds
it appropriate to agree to confidentiality provisions of one kind or
another. For example, employees and unions often feel strongly
about the importance of legal restrictions on the disclosure of
performance evaluation details, and may insist on contractual
restrictions concerning evaluations or other issues. When schools
find it necessary to enter into contractual confidentiality restric-
tions, the contract should always provide exceptions giving the
school district flexibility to fulfill legal and other public duties.
Exceptions generally should be provided allowing disclosure of: (1)
an overall performance assessment without reference to details; (2)
compensation decisions based on evaluations; (3) discipline,
termination or non-renewal decisions based on evaluations; (4) any
information for purposes of employment references; (5) any
information under circumstances where the employee discloses
information about the same matter; and (6) any information under
circumstances where law or public duty require release of informa-
tion as determined by school officials in their sole discretion.
As to settlement agreements, school districts cannot agree to
refrain from reporting information where required under the
Professional Standards Act.251 If reporting is not mandatory,
school officials must balance all factors, particularly moral obliga-
tions for the protection of students and possible Methacton liability.
If a school district agrees not to report, it must retain the right to
cooperate and provide information if an investigation is com-
menced independent of the school district.
Naturally, school districts which have assumed contractual
restrictions on disclosure of personnel information must consider
251. See supra Part One I.B.
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their existing contractual rights in developing a disclosure policy or
releasing information in any specific situation.
II. Non-Legal Considerations Affecting Release Of Information
In addition to specific legal requirements, a decision to release
information must also take account of non-legal considerations.
A. Non-Legal Considerations Favoring Confidentiality
Non-legal arguments favoring confidentiality include accepted
norms, protection of individuals involved, union or employee
demands, and the importance of effective investigations.
1. Accepted principle ofprivacy.-It is generally accepted that
a principle of privacy applies to personnel matters, and that
information should remain private except when a strong reason to
publicize exists. This is in essence an embodiment of the general
principle on which common law privacy rights are built to the effect
that an individual is entitled to privacy as to issues relating to the
individual's private life unless there is a countervailing public or
other private interest. 2  This norm also facilitates effective
working relationships between employers and employees. Em-
ployers are able to improve employee performance most effectively
when supervisor discussions with employees are frank, open and
unimpeded by concerns about third party perceptions. Likewise,
employee relations with other employees benefit from the sense of
security which results from tight control over personnel informa-
tion, providing a more desirable work environment where em-
ployees need not be concerned about possible embarrassment
resulting from widespread discussion of work problems. Publicity
of work problems can undermine the employee's self confidence,
credibility and future ability to perform effectively. Thus, both
employee and employer work related expectations would be
defeated by unfettered publicity of personnel matters; and effective
personnel administration would be difficult, if not impossible.
2. Protection of employee, family and victims.-In addition to
enhancing personnel administration, the principle of privacy also
protects the parties involved in a case of misconduct from embar-
rassment or humiliation. Avoiding unnecessary adverse publicity
252. See supra Part One I.F.2.
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not only spares the employee from such embarrassment, but also
shields the employee's family from difficulties suffered through no
action of their own. Furthermore, in cases where a student or
another employee is improperly harassed or abused, the victim may
find it humiliating to have details revealed. Accordingly, protecting
victims is often a compelling reason to withhold, or selectively
release, information regarding employee misconduct.
3. Employee or union demand.-In responding to misconduct,
school districts often encounter resistance against disciplinary action
from the employee or employee union. In some cases, school
districts request an employee's resignation in order to avoid formal
discipline proceedings. However, the employee often refuses to
comply unless the district capitulates to a demand that no disclo-
sure of the employee's misconduct be made to future employers,
the Professional Standards and Practice Commission, the public or
others. In some cases, a properly limited agreement to confidenti-
ality is an appropriate and acceptable action by school officials
which serves the public interest by allowing prompt resolution of
a personnel matter, avoiding the adverse impact a formal hearing
may have on students or family members, and mitigating the time
and costs associated with extended legal proceedings.
4. Effective investigations. -Privacy may also facilitate
effective investigations. School officials frequently receive com-
plaints of employee misconduct, and must conduct an appropriate
investigation to determine the facts prior to taking any action.
Such investigations often require the cooperation of employee or
student witnesses. In most cases, employees and students are more
likely to share information when they understand the information
will be held confidential. On the other hand, the prospect of public
disclosure of information provided by witnesses can have a chilling
effect on witness cooperation, thereby prejudicing the ability of
school districts to uncover the truth.
Maintaining the confidentiality of information provided
through an investigation also protects the integrity of the investiga-
tion. Credibility can be seriously undermined when information
provided in an investigation is unnecessarily disclosed, possibly
giving the appearance that political considerations have affected the
investigation.
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B. Non-legal Considerations Favoring Disclosure
Non-legal factors favoring disclosure fall into two general
categories. The first category relates to government accountability
(in many cases the same policy considerations underlying the open
government statutes). 3  The second category relates to good
public relations. Although much of the following discussion is
undoubtedly basic, these considerations are significant and must be
weighed in the disclosure balance.
1. Government accountability. -As tax-financed government
agencies performing essential government functions, school districts
are held to a different standard of accountability than private
employers.' This standard applies to all school business,
including personnel matters. The public has a direct interest in the
proper and efficient administration of school district affairs, an
effective educational program and in teachers and other school
employees acting as appropriate role models for students. The
public cannot judge whether these interests are satisfied and hold
elected school officials accountable for their performance, however,
unless relevant information is provided.
a. School Board duties and status as public officials.-It is a
fundamental characteristic of the American system of public
education that school boards have overall responsibility for
ensuring the effective operation of our schools.55 Though school
boards employ administrators to implement this responsibility on
a daily basis, 6 board members retain primary responsibility,
fulfilled by establishing policy, overseeing the school system, and
hiring and firing employees.7 Indeed, because education is
essentially a people process, personnel decisions are among the
most important made by administrators and school boards.
However, as elected officials, school directors are ultimately
accountable to the voters, and voters have a legitimate interest in
knowing whether the school board and administration are hiring
253. See supra Part One I.A.
254. For a discussion of policy considerations underlying open government statutes, see
supra Part One I.A.
255. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3-301 (West 1992).
256. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 10-1071, 10-1089, 11-1106 (West 1992).
257. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5-510, 3-301, 5-508 (West 1992).
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good employees, getting rid of poor performers, and maintaining
effective employment policies."8 In order to properly evaluate
board members at election time, voters arguably require some
knowledge of the facts underlying significant personnel decisions.
Only with adequate information can the voting public properly
judge board member performance.
Voters and parents naturally want information on school
employee performance and serious misconduct, but these are not
the only employment issues of public concern. Broader issues are
often at stake. For instance, school boards occasionally terminate
a superintendent or other high administrative employee based on
differences in educational philosophy. When a school board makes
a decision directly affecting educational policy, the public has a
critical interest in understanding the decision as a reflection of the
direction and educational philosophy of elected officials.
b. Public funds.-Proper use of public funds is another
legitimate interest of the public. In evaluating the taxing and
spending practices of the elected school board, voters require
information about personnel decisions impacting public funds.
Ideally, if public funds are disbursed, the public has the right to
know the amount and purpose. Because public schools are
maintained largely by tax contributions of district residents, as well
as funds derived from state and federal taxes, school officials have
an obligation to justify decisions which allocate tax dollars.
c. Parental concerns.--Parents also demand information out
of concern for their children. All children in Pennsylvania are
required to complete certain educational requirements, normally
over twelve years in the public school system. 9 During school
hours, parents must surrender responsibility for their children's
well-being to (school employees.2' As a result, parents have a
heightened interest in school employment issues, naturally wanting
to ensure the quality of the school personnel and desiring knowl-
edge of personnel problems that could adversely affect their
children.
258. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3-301 (West 1992).
259. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1326, 13-1327 (West 1992).
260. See PA. STAT ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1317 (West 1992).
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d. Public comment.-Whether motivated by protecting
children, conserving tax monies or effective government, the public
interest extends beyond the ballot box to providing regular input
to elected officials. Public comment on government action is one
of the lynch pins of our democratic system of government-so
important it is guaranteed by the First Amendment. In the words
of the United States Supreme Court:
The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public
questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been
settled by our decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have
said, "was fashioned to assure [the] unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.
261
Constructive public comment, of course, requires information about
personnel and other public issues.
2. Good public relations.-At times, the school board and
administration may be well-advised to release certain information
simply as a matter of good public relations. In cases of a highly
visible employee, such as a superintendent or athletic coach, or
where prior publicity on a personnel issue has alerted the public
eye, controversy may be unavoidable. As a practical matter, school
boards can often reduce public controversy and serve the best
interests of all involved by voluntarily releasing information.
Furthermore, such action allows school officials to exercise control
over the information circulating.
a. Leaked information.-The media and the public often
criticize schools when information initially maintained as confiden-
tial latei leaks out, as frequently occurs. Controversial issues must
then be addressed by officials after action has been taken, and
after-the-fact explanations many times appear defensive and are not
well-received. When circumstances suggest that information leaks
are possible, school boards should consider opting for disclosure
sooner rather than later. This proactive approach will not only
satisfy the public's desire for facts, but also present a positive image
and allow the school board to maintain a degree of control.
261. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
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b. Get the truth out.-Lack of public access to correct
information often results in the proliferation of rumors. False
versions of events often cause more damage to school districts and
individuals affected by personnel decisions than release of accurate
information. Again, by taking a proactive approach, school officials
can often solve this problem through sharing appropriate informa-
tion with the public in a timely manner. By doing so, school
officials generally will serve the district and affected individuals
better than leaving matters to rumor mill speculation. Conse-
quently, schools are often best advised to release information and
get the truth out.
c. Eliminate negative distractions.-Despite the best efforts to
maintain confidentiality, controversy and criticism of school officials
often persist until the district provides some official information or
explanation. With the media fueling public demands, prompt
release of limited information can be the best way for school
officials to assure the public a proper decision has been made, to
turn attention away from negative distractions, and to restore the
focus on more important educational issues.
The conclusion of this analysis must be that the disclosure
balance involves many different considerations, legal and non-legal,
some favoring confidentiality and some favoring disclosure. The
challenge, of course, is to strike the appropriate balance.
III. Striking The Balance-Summary And Strategies For An
Effective Personnel Information Policy
With so many competing legal and nonlegal considerations,
developing an appropriate personnel information disclosure policy
may initially appear an intimidating endeavor. However, school
districts should not shy away. Developing a policy in advance of
specific personnel problems will provide school officials with
necessary guidelines to protect the interests of all parties and avoid
undesirable consequences. Based on the previously developed
comprehensive overview, we offer the following summary and
suggested strategies and policy components.
In developing a policy and making decisions in specific cases,
it is important that school districts keep in mind the interests, both
legal and nonlegal, of the many different potentially interested
constituencies. The constituencies obviously include the school
district itself and employees directly involved in the personnel issue,
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but also include other school employees and administrators, school
board members, potential future employers of school employees,
students and families of students and affected employees, as well
as employee organizations, parents, taxpayers, the general public
and the media. The interests and legal rights of all audiences need
to be carefully balanced.
A. The Legal Framework
Legal requirements exist on both sides of the issue. The
following general legal rules establish the legal framework for
decisions on release of information.
" Right to Know Law-Upon request by a citizen, school
districts must make available for review any public records,
namely contracts dealing with receipt or disbursement of
funds and minutes or decisions establishing rights. Excep-
tions exist for communications that would reveal the
results of an investigation, or records that would prejudice
an individual's reputation, in effect a "personnel excep-
tion. 1
262
* Sunshine Law-This statute generally mandates that
discussion occur at public meetings. However, there is a
limited "personnel exception." School districts may discuss
personnel matters in private session, but all official action
on personnel matters must take place at an open meet-
ing.
263
* Pennsylvania School Code-The Code also mandates that
formal action occur at a public meeting, but recognizes the
importance of privacy in certain personnel matters. School
districts must comply with mandatory procedural require-
ments of the School Code, including the right of an
employee to a private dismissal hearing.2 4
* Professional Standards Act-Schools must report to the
Pennsylvania Department of Education certain cases of
employee misconduct, and have the option to report other
types of cases. The Department and the Professional
Standards and Practice Commission have jurisdiction over
262. See supra Part One I.A.1.
263. See supra Part One I.A.2.
264. See supra Part One I.A.2.
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professional certification. Schools must report when an
employee is dismissed for cause, and also when an employ-
ee is formally charged of certain crimes. If an employee
resigns in the face of accusations, reporting is optional, and
school officials need to determine based on the facts and
circumstances whether there is a moral or ethical obliga-
tion to report for the protection of school children. The
Act mandates confidentiality concerning information
provided to the Department and the Commission.2 6
* Child Protective Services Law-Child abuse by school
employees or home perpetrators must be reported to
designated authorities, subject to confidentiality restric-
tions.
266
* Requirements of Legal Proceedings or Investiga-
tions-Schools must provide personnel information as
required by subpoenas and other legal process. School
officials also need to decide when voluntary reporting to
police is appropriate for employee misconduct. 67
* The School Code gives the school board the job of serving
as the jury at hearings in contested disciplinary proceed-
ings. Procedural due process requirements under both the
federal and state constitutions mandate that school boards
be impartial and unbiased in fulfilling this role. These
mandates in turn limit the information which may be
disclosed to the public prior to a hearing in that public
disclosure would reach the school board and could create
pre-hearing bias.
268
* FERPA and State Educational Records Regulations-
School officials must avoid any release of information
concerning employees that includes student information
and would therefore violate student privacy rights.
269
265. See supra Part One I.B.
266. See supra Part One I.C.
267. See supra Part One I.D.
268. See infra Part Two IV.B.C.
269. See supra Part One I.I.
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B. Other Specific Legal Rules
The following are additional specific guidelines derived from
the above laws and court cases.
No law requires public discussion of personnel matters.
On the contrary, all applicable laws, including the Right to
Know Law, the Sunshine Law, and the School Code,
contain "personnel exceptions" allowing confidentiality of
personnel matters. However, the School Code provides
for public dismissal hearings in certain cases where desired
by an employee, and the Sunshine Law and School Code
require publicity as to final school board decisions.37
The decision whether a matter is discussed in public or
private generally is a decision made by the school district,
not the employee. The School Code provides an exception
in that a professional employee determines whether a
dismissal hearing is public or private."
Personnel files are not public records.2"
Disciplinary hearing records generally are not public re-
cordsYm
Resignation or disciplinary settlement agreements gen-
erally need not be disclosed to the public, as long as the
key settlement points, such as disbursement of public funds
or termination of employment, are incorporated in a
publicly adopted resolution.274
Records showing disbursement of public funds are public
records'75
The law is unsettled on whether school board written
decisions explaining personnel actions must be disclosed in
public. Accordingly, in order to avoid risk of reversal,
schools are generally best advised to make required
270. See supra Part One I.A.
271. See supra Part One I.A.
272. See supra Part One I.A.1.
273. See supra Part One I.A.1.
274. See supra Part One I.A.
275. See supra Part One I.A.1.
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findings and conclusions part of the public record.
Possible exceptions may exist in unusual cases where
appropriate to protect innocent victims. This decision
must be made on a case by case basis. In some cases,
schools may also wish to disclose the written decision in
order to correct false information or to end rumors.
276
C. Monetary Liability Concerns
The rules summarized so far derive from specific statutory
requirements and safe harbors. These rules, however, are just the
starting point in many cases. In addition to the above listed
considerations, schools need to be aware of potential monetary
liability and various other legal and public policy concerns.
Highlighting the difficulty of implementing a proper policy,
monetary liability can occur either way. Schools may be subjected
to liability for improper disclosure or for failure to disclose.
Officials need to understand the potential liability and avoid
liability, keeping in mind:
" Defamation Law-Personnel information should be
released on a need to know basis, strictly limited to
verified facts, and in the case of employment references,
opinions based on verified facts. Information should be
released only by designated school officials, and should
always be communicated in an objective and unemotional
manner.
2n
* Privacy Rights-Constitutional and Common Law-Again,
schools should avoid unnecessary publicity about personnel
matters, releasing information on a need to know ba-
sis.
278
* Section 1983-Protection of Students-Whenever there is
a complaint of student abuse by a school employee,
schools should investigate immediately, take appropriate
action, and not withhold information about the misconduct
from potential future employers. This is extremely
important both for protection of students and to avoid
monetary liability.
279
276. See supra Part One I.A.3.
277. See supra Part One I.F.1.
278. See supra Part One I.F.2.
279. See supra Part One I.G.
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The law gives school districts, school officials, and school
employees substantial protection against liability, through
"municipal immunity," but this protection is not com-
plete."'
D. Employment Reference Requests
For the benefit of all involved-students, employees and school
districts--districts should seriously consider implementing a policy
that gives prospective employers meaningful employee references.
These references should include facts about good and bad perfor-
mance and any significant misconduct. Open lines of communica-
tion between employers are necessary to allow effective hiring, to
ensure the best for students and taxpayers, to protect students, and
to satisfy ethical responsibilities. Open communication, however,
may involve some liability risk. To satisfy these responsibilities
while minimizing the potential for defamation claims, school
districts should consider policies that encourage comprehensive
disclosure subject to the defamation and liability protection rules
set forth in the preceding paragraph. 1  The law gives school
employers acting in good faith an enormous shield against liability,
particularly when the suggested liability protection rules are
followed.'
E. Employee Contract Negotiation
In negotiating employee and union employment contracts,
schools should avoid confidentiality obligations whenever possible
so as to following the basic premise of privacy while retaining some
flexibility to release information when necessary without fear of
liability. While schools without question generally should maintain
the confidentiality of employee performance evaluations, schools
should avoid contractual restrictions that would prevent release or
risk monetary liability for release where the district determines that
release is required by law or is otherwise necessary or appropriate.
Recognizing that schools may be asked to enter contractual
agreements governing the confidentiality of performance comment
details, schools should be careful to provide appropriate exceptions
in cases where confidentially is agreed to contractually. School
280. See supra Part One I.F.
281. See supra Part One III.C.
282. See supra Part One I.F.3.
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districts should provide exceptions allowing disclosure of the
following items:
* Overall performance assessments without reference to
details.
* Compensation decisions based on evaluations.
Discipline, termination or non-renewal decisions based on
evaluations.
* Any information for purposes of employment references.
Any information under circumstances where the employee
discloses information about the same matter.
Any information under circumstances where law or public
duty require release of information as determined by the
school district in its sole discretion.
The provision of these exceptions not only will give school
districts flexibility, but also will allow, as appropriate, discussion of
personnel decisions based on overall performance assessments;
compliance with legal requirements for compensation disclosure;
explanation of school board personnel decisions; proper response
to employment reference requests; explanation when an employee
provides misleading information to the media; and the exercise of
good judgment on whether to release personnel information.
F Resignation and Settlement Agreements
As noted earlier, resignation or disciplinary settlement agree-
ments generally need not be made public.' In balancing compet-
ing interests, good reasons may exist for keeping such documents
or the reasons for the resignation or disciplinary action confidential.
Negotiation of agreements should be conducted under the employ-
ee contract negotiation rules set forth in the preceding paragraph.2
However, the exceptions to confidentiality for compensation and
discipline decisions do not apply, and schools should add the
following further exceptions to any confidentiality commitment or
decision.
283. See supra Part One I.A.
284. See supra Part One III.E.
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* School districts cannot agree to refrain from reporting to
the Department of Education under the Professional
Standards Act where reporting is required by law.m
* If reporting is not mandatory, school district policy on
reporting or disclosure should balance such factors as
moral obligations, protection of students and possible
liability under Methacton.2"
* If a school district agrees not to report, it must retain the
right to cooperate and provide information if an investiga-
tion is started independently of the school district.2
G. Existing Contractual Restrictions
If school districts have entered into contractual restrictions as
a part of employment contracts, resignation or settlement agree-
ments, collective bargaining agreements, or otherwise, those
districts should carefully consider the applicable restrictions prior
to any information release.
H. Release of Information in the Absence of Controlling Legal
Considerations
Legal considerations may dictate a particular course.'
However, more often than not, there are no controlling legal
factors, and school officials need to make a judgment based on
policy considerations. The following are suggested guidelines for
this decisionmaking.
1. Beginning premise of nondisclosure.-Because the interest
of all parties.is generally best served through confidentiality, school
districts should operate under a beginning premise of nondisclosure
when dealing with employee matters. Not only should the premise
of nondisclosure be the beginning premise, but also the school
board should articulate this premise regularly, so the public
understands the board's reasons for disclosure or nondisclosure,
and so the board is not placed under unnecessary pressure by a
public perception that pressure will produce confidential informa-
285. See supra Part One I.B.
286. See supra Part One I.B-G.
287. See supra Part One I.B-D.
288. See supra Part One I.
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tion. A school board should never hesitate to acknowledge and
declare the fundamental principle of the confidentiality of person-
nel information.
2. Exceptions to premise-Case-by-case decision.-From this
beginning premise of nondisclosure, a judgment must be made in
each case as to whether legal obligations or other interests justify
an alternate course. Without doubt, the potential recipient of the
information is a major influence on any decision. Dissimilar
repercussions result from sharing information with the media, as
opposed to voluntary reporting of misconduct to authorities or
responding to an employment reference request. In cases where
disclosure is neither required nor prohibited by legal or ethical
responsibilities, a decision by school officials to release facts may
nevertheless be warranted simply by good public relations. For
instance, the importance of strong public relations may wan-ant the
release of information due to the highly visible position of an upper
level administrator or popular football coach, or prior public
controversy over the individual. On the other hand, public interest
is significantly diminished where a lower level employee commits
less-than-outrageous misconduct or is just guilty of poor perfor-
mance.
3. Balancing test/degrees of disclosure.-If an exception to the
beginning premise of nondisclosure is justified based on the general
public right to know, school officials should determine the nature
and amount of information to release by balancing confidentiality
concerns against the legitimate public interest in disclosure. Just as
many legal rules require balancing of some kind, the decision of
what to disclose about an employee should in many cases involve
a balancing process.
The interest of the public may be served, for example, through
the following degrees of disclosure:
In the case of a high level administrator, the public
generally should have knowledge of a termination based
on differences in educational philosophy. Because such a
termination is the result of a policy decision of board
members elected by voters, at the very least the school
board should ensure that the public understands its educa-
tional philosophy.
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* In the case of an employee dismissed for misconduct or
poor performance, school board members may be con-
fronted with questions in private or at an open meeting.
The premise of nondisclosure should be applied, particu-
larly if there is a need for protection of victims or a lack
of solid proof Accordingly, the board might simply
respond to questions by stating that employment was
terminated, but the circumstances are confidential as a
personnel matter. Similarly, the board generally should
not publicly disclose reprimand or other action short of
dismissal, and the board normally should decline comment
on such personnel issues.
Under the previous example, the balance might shift
toward more, but limited, disclosure if circumstances
involve prior publicity, proliferation of rumors or unin-
tended leakage of information. Similarly, if the employee
makes statements of incorrect information to students,
parents or the media in an effort to garner public support,
the district should consider disclosure. These factors can
stimulate greater interest in a personnel matter and
increase a school district's need to disseminate correct
information. The information to be released, however,
should be considered carefully. Furthermore, there may
be times, frustrating no doubt, when employees go public
or rumors flow, and school officials because of due process
or other concerns simply must remain silent, at least until
a hearing is concluded.
Prior to a disciplinary hearing, regardless of whether
rumors exist or employees make inaccurate statements,
school officials must severely limit any information
released. Due process requires limitations on the informa-
tion received by school board members who must remain
impartial and unbiased prior to a hearing.2 As a result of
these requirements, school officials may be unable to
answer employee claims to students, parents or the media
or to clarify rumors until after the hearing is conducted
and a decision rendered.
If public funds are disbursed as severance pay pursuant to
a negotiated resignation, school officials should consider
289. See infra Part Two IV.B-C.
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voluntary disclosure of the terms and amount of payment.
While a settlement agreement might not be a "public
record" under the Right to Know Law, as a result of refer-
ring to the factual basis of the termination, allowing
nondisclosure of its contents, it is important to recognize
the legitimate public interest in the use of public funds,
and the Sunshine Law requires action at a public meeting
on severance pay and on any settlement agreement.219
* If a personnel issue results in a hearing and dismissal by
formal board action without a resignation or a settlement
agreed to by the employee, the board in most cases should
prepare a written decision setting forth the facts and make
this document public.29
* If parents complain at a public meeting or otherwise about
an employee and the matter has not yet been investigated,
the board or administration should consider terminating
the discussion and requesting that the parents share their
concerns in private with an administrator. In any event,
the complaining person should be assured the matter will
be investigated. If the employee is later cleared, the board
should consider whether to advise the parents or make a
public statement of the findings. This may be necessary
either to assure parents that the matter has been carefully
considered or to clear the employee's name.
* In any case, school officials should never mislead the
public or cover up information. In situations where no
basis for confidentiality exists, school districts have a duty
to observe the general public right to know. Conversely,
if there is reason to keep information confidential, schools
should simply say that the matter is a confidential parson-
nel issue.
4. Public policy considerations.-School districts need to
consider various public policy factors in determining whether to
disclose personnel information. Considerations favoring disclosure
include government accountability and good public relations.2" As
to government accountability, factors to be considered include the
290. See supra Part One I.A.
291. See supra Part One I.A.3.
292. See supra Part One II.B.
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the public right to have information sufficient to judge the decisions
of elected officials; the public interest in the manner of expenditure
of public funds; parental concerns for the welfare of their school
children; and the public right of comment on government decisions.
As to good public relations, where information is sure to reach the
public, the school district is often better served by releasing
information promptly rather than responding to questions and
demands. Getting the truth out avoids proliferation of false
rumors, and controlled publicity often avoids controversy and
consequent negative distractions from focus on more important
educational issues. Opposing policy considerations include the
general principle of privacy; protection of the employee, victims or
potential witnesses; employee or union demands allowing the
expeditious resolution of certain disciplinary disputes; and the
enhancement of the ability to conduct effective investigations.293
5. Proactive approach.-Where publicity is inevitable, school
officials should be proactive and plan in advance the nature and
amount of information to be released.
6. Pressure from outside sources.-Whatever decision is
reached, school officials must be prepared to maintain the position
they believe is right and proper, regardless of pressure from outside
sources. Outside pressure, whether from parents, the media or any
other source, is not good cause for releasing information when
circumstances call for nondisclosure. Schools, however, should
readily comply with requests for information where there is a
public right to know.
7 Flexibility.-Schools should always be prepared to change
their position where circumstances demand. For example, if an
employee talks to the media, the school district may need either to
clarify its position or correct misinformation.
I. Conclusions on Public Information Release
While school officials face a confluence of competing forces,
school officials by following the suggested rules can develop an
effective personnel information policy and make the right decisions
in individual cases. In doing so, school officials can reconcile the
293. See supra Part One II.A.
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differing interests of various audiences and achieve a comfort level
in dealing with this challenge.
Part Two of this article addresses related issues concerning
school board access to information. These related issues often arise
from the same personnel matters.
Part Two-The School Board
IV. School Board Access To Personnel Information And
Involvement In Personnel Issues: General Rules And
Lyness Due Process Requirements
So far this article has discussed release of information beyond
the school board-to the media, general public, and other constitu-
encies outside of the school board and school administration.
Equally important, however, are issues arising from the sharing of
information between the administration and school board.
Boards of school directors have ultimate responsibility for the
effective operation of public schools. While boards delegate
responsibility for day-to-day supervision to administrators, they
remain accountable for policy and general oversight. As a natural
result of this responsibility, school directors have a strong interest
in the performance of teachers and other school employees.
Similarly, since school administrators answer to and are evaluated
by the school board, administrators naturally seek to demonstrate
their supervisory abilities and proper enforcement of school policies
to the school board.
These factors provide impetus for administrators to share and
school board members to request personnel information. To avoid
directors overstepping their bounds and becoming involved in daily
administration as opposed to policy and general oversight, school
boards and administrators should give thought to the information
flow.
The school board's quasi-judicial role in employee dismissal
hearings adds a legal due process dimension to this issue, lending
further import to proper controls. The School Code and Local
Agency Law assign the school board responsibility for conducting
and rendering unbiased hearings and decisions on employee
dismissals and other personnel decisions.29 Considering the
294. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1129, 5-514 (West 1992); 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 553 (West 1995); Brentwood Borough Sch. Dist. Appeal, 267 A.2d 848, 851-52 (Pa. 1970);
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board's responsibilities, how much information should administra-
tors share with the school board? What are the rights of school
directors to information about individual employees? What are the
potential hazards of providing too much or too little information?
A. School Code Provisions and Right to Know Law
While these questions are not answered conclusively by the
School Code or Right to Know Law, several sections provide
helpful guidance.295
School Code Section 301 states: "The public school system of
the Commonwealth shall be administered by a board of school
directors .... ."" This is the provision assigning ultimate respon-
sibility to the school board for an effective school system.
School Code Section 407 gives the school board authority to
"adopt reasonable rules and regulations for its government and
control."2" School Code Section 510 further provides that "[t]he
board of school directors in any school district may adopt and
enforce such reasonable rules and regulations as it may deem
necessary and proper, regarding the management of its school
affairs, and the conduct and deportment of all superintendents,
teachers, and other appointees or employees .... ,,291 These two
sections give school boards the power to adopt rules relating to
personnel matters and information access.
Several provisions expressly address reports and information
made available to the school board. School Code Section 433
provides that the school board secretary is the custodian of all
records and papers of the school district, presumably giving the
secretary unrestricted access to information unless limited by board
adopted rules. 299  Section 433 further requires the secretary to
Wissahickon Sch. Dist. v. McKown, 400 A.2d 899, 901 (Pa. Conmw. Ct. 1979); Dept. of
Educ. v. Oxford Area Sch. Dist., 356 A.2d 857, 860-61 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976); Rayne v.
Edgewood Sch. Dist., 339 A.2d 151, 153 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975). The Pennsylvania
Constitution similarly guarantees due process of law which has been determined to include
the right to an impartial tribunal. Lyness v. State Bd. of Medicine, 605 A.2d 1204, 1210-11
(Pa. 1992). The due process clause of the federal Constitution also guarantees an impartial
tribunal. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
295. See also Personnel Files: Right to Access by School Board Members, EDUCATION
LAW FOCUS, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Pennsylvania School Boards Association Apr. 1992).
296. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3-301 (West 1992).
297. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4-407 (West 1992).
298. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5-510 (West 1992).
299. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4-433 (West 1992).
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furnish any reports concerning school affairs requested by the
school board.3" Once again, in the absence of a board rule or
regulation, presumably the board could request any kind of
personnel information.
The School Code fails to address specifically school director
access to personnel information or involvement in daily supervision
of employees. However, various provisions indicate that such
responsibilities reside with administrators, and not the school
board. For example, School Code Section 1081 assigns to the
superintendent responsibility for visiting classrooms and giving
instruction in teaching when deemed necessary.3 1  Similarly,
§ 1123 provides that teachers shall be rated by the superintendent
or other administrators under the superintendent's supervision.3
°2
While the Right to Know Law provides no additional insight
on this issue, the courts have established that personnel records are
not public records under the Right to Know Law.
3°3
While there are no cases directly on point, these statutory
provisions viewed together lead to the conclusion that school board
members have authority to request information in accordance with
rules adopted by the board, but generally have no role in individual
employee evaluations or the development and maintenance of
routine personnel information. Nevertheless, recognizing the
responsibility of school directors for dismissal decisions and
oversight of the school system, situations commonly arise where
school board members properly ask questions and expect informa-
tion about individual employees and personnel issues. The obvious
solution to this conflict is for the school board to exercise its
discretion by adopting rules limiting access and delineating the
circumstances under which school directors may'obtain personnel
information.
B. Due Process Requirements
Court decisions mandate additional caution based on due
process requirements implicated in school board adjudication of
employee dismissals. These court decisions, combined with specific
dismissal steps prescribed by the School Code, further complicate
300. Id.
301. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 10-1081 (West 1992).
302. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1123 (West 1992).
303. See supra Part One I.A.1.
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policy formulation on board member access to personnel informa-
tion.
1. The Pennsylvania due process dilemma/Lyness wall of
division.-Under the School Code, school boards must furnish all
tenured professional employees with a statement of charges and
conduct a hearing prior to dismissal.' Nonprofessional em-
ployees must also be given a statement of the basis for dismissal
and have the right to demand a hearing, except when terminated
for reasons of economy.35 School board hearings cast the school
board in the roles of both judge and jury.3  As a result, the
potential for prejudice among board members exists because
"either actual bias or the appearance of bias offends due process
and taints the validity of the proceedings.,
37
Where there is a school board hearing, the normal procedure
is for the superintendent or school administration to assume the
prosecutorial role, first recommending dismissal to the school
board, and then presenting the case in support of dismissal to the
school board at the hearing. As judge and jury, the school board
listens to the evidence, rules on evidentiary questions, determines
questions of credibility, and decides whether grounds exist for
dismissal, and whether dismissal or some other form of discipline
is appropriate.3°8
For tenured employees, the procedure is further complicated
by the School Code requirement that the statement of charges,
containing a detailed account of the basis for dismissal, be signed
by the school board president and secretary.3 °9 Details in the
statement of charges, as well as any pre-hearing information
provided the school board, potentially conflict with the necessity for
adjudication by an unbiased school board. On one hand, the
school board president and secretary obviously must have some
304. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1127 (West 1992).
305. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5-514 (West 1992); Genco v. Bristol Borough Sch. Dist.,
423 A.2d 36 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980).
306. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1129 (West 1992).
307. Sharon City Sch. Dist. v. Hudson, 383 A.2d 249 (Pa. Conmw. Ct. 1978).
308. See LEVIN, supra note 248, § 401.
309. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1127 (West 1992). Very importantly, the School Code
does not require that a school board vote prior to delivering the pre-hearing charges to the
employee. Clark v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 387 A.2d 1027 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978). As noted
in our discussion below, due process concerns suggest the school board should not vote on
the statement of charges prior to delivering the charges to the employee and conducting a
hearing. See infra Part Two IV.C.5.
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pre-hearing information in connection with providing a statement
of detailed charges. On the other hand, too much pre-hearing
information might taint the procedure and create bias in violation
of due process.
The same dilemma is often raised at earlier stages of a
personnel problem. School directors commonly hear complaints at
public meetings about teachers or other employees; receive
telephone calls from parents lodging complaints; hear administrator
criticism or evaluation of employees as a part of discussion of
programs, projects or salaries; or observe substandard performance.
It is impossible and would be nonsensical to expect school board
members to have no prior exposure to information when a
dismissal hearing commences. How can a school board fulfill its
oversight responsibilities without creating a legal problem in the
event of a later dismissal hearing? How much information should
be provided to the board when an employee is guilty of misconduct
or poor performance not initially sufficient to warrant dismissal or
when allegations are made against an employee and no investiga-
tion has yet been completed to determine the validity of the
allegations? To what extent may or should the board be involved
in an investigation?
Lyness v. State Board of Medicine"'° is a critical case in
answering these questions, demonstrating Pennsylvania's strict
requirements and the severe consequences of procedural due
process defects. Though its exact applicability to school districts
remains ambiguous, Lyness has sent shock waves, and no doubt will
generate significant legal repercussions for school boards.
This case involved a brain surgeon's alleged sexual molestation
of a seventeen year old female patient while in intensive care
recovering from surgery. The allegations resulted in an emergency
hearing of the Pennsylvania Board of Medicine during which the
Board voted to authorize the prosecuting attorney to initiate
disciplinary action against Dr. Lyness, the accused doctor.
Eventually, six more female patients came forth, describing similar
incidents of awakening from sedation to find the doctor sexually
molesting them. An independent hearing examiner conducted
lengthy hearings and found the evidence overwhelmingly credible.
310. 605 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1992). Note that this decision was a 3-2 decision, with two of
the Supreme Court Justices dissenting from the holding of the majority.
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The Board then met and reviewed de novo the evidence and
findings, and voted to permanently revoke the doctor's license.3 11
In Lyness, relying on Pennsylvania constitutional due process
concerns about the Board's impartiality in making its final decision,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned the license revoca-
tion. 12 The court's action, despite such outrageous and egregious
facts, illustrates the importance attached by the courts to ensuring
that government decisionmakers are without bias.
The court stressed that while due process is not capable of
exact definition, one of the basic elements is providing an indi-
vidual who is deprived of rights with a hearing before a fair and
impartial tribunal.1 3 Further, and very importantly, due process
requires more than an absence of actual bias; even an appearance
of bias may violate due process. 4 The opinion discussed a long
line of Pennsylvania cases invalidating adjudication procedures,
without regard to the existence of actual bias, where the same
individuals were involved in making a decision to prosecute and
also deciding the ultimate merits of the case.
15
The court explained that this commingling of functions alone
creates an appearance of bias, rendering the process unconstitu-
tional, even without actual bias. 16 The court stated: "A man
cannot sit as judge when he is a member of a board which has
brought the accusations." '17  Further, the court found improper
commingling where the Board voted to initiate the disciplinary
process and rendered the ultimate adjudication, emphasizing the
critical importance of separating the prosecuting and decision-
making functions in order to avoid any possible pre-hearing bias of
the decisionmaker:
311. i at 1205-06.
312. Id. at 1211. In rendering this decision, the court relied on Pennsylvania consti-
tutional requirements for due process of law, not the federal Constitution due process
requirements. Id. at 1207. The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the almost
identical federal requirements, has reached a different conclusion. See infra Part Two IV.B.3.
313. 605 A.2d at 1207 (citing Commonwealth v. Thompson, 281 A.2d 856, 858 (Pa.
1971)).
314. Id. at 1207.
315. Id. at 1207 (referring to Commonwealth, Dep't of Ins. v. An. Bankers Ins. Co., 387
A.2d 449 (Pa. 1978); Dussia v. Barger, 351 A.2d 667 (Pa. 1975); Gardner v. Repasky, 252
A.2d 704 (Pa. 1969)).
316. Id. at 1210.
317. Id. at 1208 (quoting Gardner v. Repasky, 252 A.2d 704, 706 (Pa. 1969)).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
What our Constitution requires, however, is that if more than
one function is reposed in a single administrative entity, walls
of division be constructed which eliminate the threat or
appearance of bias. As then-Justice Nix stated so percipiently
in concurrence in American Bankers, a "mere tangential
involvement" of an adjudicator in the decision to initiate
proceeding is not enough to raise the red flag of procedural due
process. Our Constitutional notion of due process does not
require a tabula rasa. However, where the very entity or
individuals involved in the decision to prosecute are "signifi-
cantly involved" in the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings,
a violation of due process occurs.
318
Thus, to the extent applicable, Lyness requires "walls of division"
between prosecution and decision making and precludes the school
board from "significant involvement" in prosecution steps. But it
allows "mere tangential involvement," and does not require that
the decisionmaker come to a hearing with a "tabula rasa."
The Lyness court also made clear that a single governmental
entity may conduct both prosecution and adjudication functions, as
long as different individuals within the government entity handle
these functions.319 The court distinguished Lyness from a prior
case, State Dental Council and Examining Board v. Polock,32 in
which the process for suspending a dentist's license was upheld.321
In Polock, different individuals within the same administrative
agency held prosecution and decisionmaking roles.3"
Lyness creates a serious concern that school board involvement
in the decision to prosecute, and receipt of information prior to and
outside a formal dismissal hearing, could taint and invalidate
dismissal proceedings, regardless of the severity of misconduct.3z
318. Lyness, 605 A.2d at 1209-10 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In upholding the
Pennsylvania Insurance Department's licensure procedure, the court has since stressed the
importance of a "wall of division" between investigation, prosecution and adjudication
functions. Stone and Edwards Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dep't of Ins., 648
A.2d 304, 308 (Pa. 1994). In this case, the court found that there was a sufficient division
of responsibility within the governmental agency between prosecution and decisionmaking.
319. Id. at 1208-09.
320. 318 A.2d 910 (Pa. 1974).
321. Lyness, 605 A.2d at 1209.
322. Id.
323. Several older Commonwealth Court cases, relying on federal rather than state due
process, rejected claimed due process violations even where the school board made a prelimi-
nary determination of guilt prior to the dismissal hearing. See Rayne v. Edgewood Sch.
Dist., 339 A.2d 151, 153 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975); Wissahickon Sch. Dist. v. McKown, 400
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But what exactly does due process require and allow for school
districts and school board members? How much involvement and
information is permitted? The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
not yet addressed these issues. 3' However, several cases decided
before and after Lyness, though not definitive, give guidance.
2. Other judicial guidance. -Prior to Lyness, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, in In re Flannery's Appeal,32 upheld the validity
of the School Code tenured employee dismissal requirements"
involving the board's delivery of detailed pre-hearing charges. In
so ruling, the court also allowed a pre-hearing decision by the full
school board that a prima facie case exists based on information
presented to the board. 3' Articulating a standard less stringent
than Lyness, the court essentially determined that due process
merely requires that board members keep an open mind prior to
the hearing, and make a decision based on the hearing evidence:
"The making of the charges presupposes that the members of
the board had some knowledge of the facts upon which the
charges were based. Unless they had an opinion that the
charges, if sustained, would warrant dismissal, they should never
have been made. That a member of the board had an opinion
at the time the charges were preferred against appellant would
not disqualify him from participating in a hearing on these
charges, or invalidate the proceedings. We do not think that
anything more was required of the members of the board than
that they could hear and determine the charges against appel-
A.2d 899,901 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979). However, Lyness has established rules that contradict
these earlier cases. If the school board cannot conduct an impartial hearing due to bias or
prior significant involvement in a case, the board normally must relinquish its hearing and
decisionmaking role to the courts. See Belle Vernon Area Sch. Dist. v. Gilmer, 415 A.2d 121
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980); Foster v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of Keystone Oaks Sch. Dist., 678
A.2d 1214 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996). This is an unfortunate consequence if it occurs prior to
a board hearing and decision, in that an important decision affecting the schools is made by
the courts instead of the body elected to oversee the schools and to make such decisions, in
addition to the extra expense, complication, and delay of court proceedings. However, it is
an even more serious consequence if it occurs as a result of a judicial reversal of a school
board decision made after a school board hearing.
324. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted a petition for allowance of appeal in
order to address these issues in the context of dismissal of a professional employee where
the board voted to prefer charges prior to the dismissal hearing. Sullenberger v. Sch. Dist.
of the City of Monessen, No. 24 Western District Allocatur Docket (Jan. 27, 1997).
325. 178 A.2d 751 (Pa. 1962).
326. Id. at 754.
327. Id.
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lant on the evidence given before them, uninfluenced by other
previous impressions." Under the provisions of the Code the
directors must believe that at least a prima facie basis exists for
the presentation of charges against the teacher and, under the
very scheme of things, must naturally have some opinion.2
In another pre-Lyness case, Lomas v. Northwestern Lehigh
School District,3 29 the court upheld the demotion of a principal,
ruling due process was not violated by either the school board's
direct involvement in a pre-hearing investigation or a prior board
decision to transfer the principal instead of taking stronger ac-
tion.33
Although not ruling directly on the point, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court after Lyness, in Krupinski v. Eastern Northampton
County Vo-Tech School,331 has indicated its continued belief that
the basic School Code procedural requirement for a statement of
charges presented by the board officers does not violate due
process.332  But in doing so, the court referred to the board as
"notifying" the employee of charges, without mentioning any
possible broader pre-hearing school board role.33
Coover v. Saucon Valley School District" is another instruc-
tive post-Lyness case. In Coover, the Northampton County Court
of Common Pleas overturned the dismissal of a superintendent,
concluding that minimal due process requirements were not met at
the school board dismissal hearing.33 The court premised its
328. Id. (quoting Spruce Hill Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Bryner, 25 A.2d 745, 748 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1942)). This same principle has been enunciated in numerous later cases. See Harmon v.
Mifflin County Sch. Dist., 651 A.2d 681 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994); Covert v. Bensalem Twp.
Sch. Dist., 522 A.2d 129, 131 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987); and Lomas v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of
Northwestern Lehigh Sch. Dist., 444 A.2d 1319 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982); Nagy v. Belle
Vernon Area Sch. Dist., 412 A.2d 172, 175 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980). Of course, this principle
is consistent with general statements of administrative law to the effect that due process
requires a fair, open and impartial hearing. See 2 AM. JUR. 2D, Administrative Law § 412
(1994).
329. 444 A.2d 1319 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
330. Id. at 1325. See also Covert v. Bensalem Twp. Sch. Dist., 522 A.2d 129 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1987) (Secretary of Education noted that an investigation of facts and
solicitation of information do not alone provide proof of school board bias).
331. 674 A.2d 683 (Pa. 1996).
332. Id. at 685 (citing Belasco v. Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 510 A.2d 337 (Pa. 1986)).
333. Id. In the Monessen case, to be decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the
board voted to approve the charges, apparently going beyond merely "notifying" the
employee. See supra note 324.
334. No. 1995-C-9226 (Northampton Co. July 10, 1996).
335. Id. at 11.
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conclusion on the combination of the role played by the prosecut-
ing attorney, together with evidence of actual bias of school board
members. The prosecuting attorney in this case provided pre-
hearing advice to the school board before assuming the role of
prosecuting attorney.336 In addition, a number of witnesses
provided evidence that some of the school board members had
demonstrated an intent, prior to hearing the evidence at the
hearing, to terminate the superintendent. 37 The court concluded
there was clear and convincing evidence of an appearance of bias,
if not definite bias, in certain school board members. 338  Very
importantly, however, the court acknowledged the continued
viability of the Lomas holding that school board members may
have some knowledge of the facts prior to a hearing.339
The Coover pre-hearing legal advice rule is also important. In
Coover, the court concluded it was not clear whether the actions of
the prosecuting attorney in both prosecuting the charges and
providing pre-hearing advice to the board were enough to taint the
proceedings in the absence of anything further.' However, the
court did stress the rule that the prosecuting attorney should not
provide pre-hearing legal advice to the school board since this
presents a risk of tainting the impartiality of the school board by
having the prosecutor act as an advisor to the school board, even
though at a pre-hearing stage.4 1 Similarly, in an earlier case, the
Commonwealth Court invalidated an administrative action in part
because the prosecuting attorney provided pre-hearing legal advice
to the decisiomaking body.
342
The pre-hearing legal advice rule goes hand-in-hand with the
substantial body of Pennsylvania cases precluding a combination of
functions by lawyers and administrators involved in school board
disciplinary hearings. The courts have clearly established that a
lawyer may not be involved in prosecuting a case at a school board
hearing and also provide advice to the school board in connection
336. Id. at 4-5.
337. Id. at 7-10.
338. Id. at 11.
339. Coover, No. 1995-C-9226 at 11.
340. Id. at 5.
341. Id. at 5.
342. See Bruteyn v. State Dental Council & Examining Bd., 380 A.2d 497, 502 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1977).
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with the hearing.343 Moreover, the same rule applies to superin-
tendents and other administrators.' These cases require that the
Lyness "walls of division" separate from the school board decision-
makers the lawyers and administrators involved in prosecution.
Through this separation, the ability of the board to maintain its
impartiality and avoid an improper combination of functions is
strengthened.
Lyness, as applied to school boards, must be read together
with Flannery, Lomas, Krupinski, Coover, and the School Code
statutory framework for dismissal procedures. At the same time,
as a part of required due process balancing of individual and
government interests, the courts must necessarily take into account
considerations of practicality.45 In stark contrast to large state
agencies employing many administrative officials and substantial
legal staffs, school districts are small government entities with very
limited budgets and small administrative staffs. Complete separa-
tion of the pre-hearing personnel administrative and prosecution
functions from the school board adjudication function is simply not
possible. Nor would such complete separation be consistent with
343. English v. Northeast Bd. of Educ., 348 A.2d 494 (Pa. Connw. Ct. 1975) (due
process violated where school board solicitor acts as prosecutor and also presides over and
makes evidentiary rulings at school board hearing); Sharon City Sch. Dist. v. Hudson, 383
A.2d 249 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (due process not violated where school board solicitor
conducting hearing merely asks clarifying questions of employee attorney and witnesses and
assists the administration in preparing a written school board decision); Steffen v. South
Middletown Township Sch. Dist., 377 A.2d 1381 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) (due process not
violated where a school board solicitor acts as prosecutor and voices objections to questions
but does not make final rulings on objections or evidentiary questions and does not
participate in board deliberations or decisionmaking); In Re Feldman, 395 A.2d 602 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1978) (due process not violated where school solicitor prosecutes the case and
prepares a written decision for the school board after an independent decision by the board
to dismiss the employee, and where the solicitor did not take part in deliberations or
decisionmaking, nor preside over the hearing, make legal rulings or advise the board during
the hearing); Boehm v. Bd. of Educ., 373 A.2d 1372 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) (different
lawyers from the same office may prosecute the case and advise the board if the functions
are not mixed). These cases all grow out of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling in Horn
v. Township of Hilltown, 337 A.2d 858 (Pa. 1975), in which the court ruled in a zoning case
that the same lawyer may not prosecute a case and advise the decisionmaking board during
the hearing or in connection with its deliberations. See also, LEVIN, supra note 248,
§ 4.05(E).
344. Occhipinti v. Olde Forge Sch. Dist., 408 A.2d 1189 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (school
superintendent may not testify against employee and thereafter outside of the hearing answer
questions from school board members during school board private deliberations);
Commonwealth v. Oxford Area Sch. Dist., 356 A.2d 857 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976) (ruling
similar to Occhipinti).
345. See infra note 346 and accompanying text.
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school board members fulfilling their statutory mandated responsi-
bilities.
This means there must be some wall of division between
prosecution and decisionmaking. But considering all of these
factors, the requirements for school boards are probably some-
where in between the Flannery "actual bias rule" and the Lyness
strict separation of functions rule, likely closer to Flannery than
Lyness. This is the message of these various cases, and also of the
many other cases establishing that the delineation of legal due
process rules essentially requires a balancing in each case of the
government interest in a particular procedure against the potential
adverse impact of the procedure on an individual.3"
Lyness struck the balance, as applied to the State Board of
Medicine, in a very rigid fashion, strictly limiting pre-hearing Board
involvement. However, the interests of both the government and
the individual differ significantly in the context of a school board.
Most importantly, as to the government interest, the responsibilities
of a school board for oversight of the school system and effective
personnel are much more extensive than those of the Board of
Medicine, which are basically policy and regulatory functions."'
To completely separate a school board from all pre-hearing
personal involvement would obliterate many of the board's basic
responsibilities. Similarly, as a state agency, the State Board has
greater resources and means, through staff legal counsel and a
larger administrative staff, to more completely separate the Board
from pre-hearing responsibilities. As to the interest of the
individual, the action of the State Board of Medicine is also more
drastic, depriving the individual of the right to practice a profes-
sion, compared to school board action terminating employment but
not precluding other employment. The end result is that the due
process balance is different in each context. School boards likely
346. Balancing is required in interpreting the due process afforded by the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Keating v. Riverside Sch. Dist., 513 A.2d 547, 550 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
Joseph Home Co. v. PUC, 467 A.2d 1212, 1215 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983). This is also the rule
under the federal Constitution. Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. 532 (1984)
(tenured public employee entitled to pre-termination hearing, but based on balancing of
government against individual interests, hearing need not be full evidentiary hearing); Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (student expulsion due process requirements); Hortonville
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976) (teacher dismissal due
process requirements).
347. See Medical Practice Act of 1985, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 422.1-422.45 (West
1996) (concerning the responsibilities of the State Board of Medicine).
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must have Lyness walls of division, but the walls need not be as
high. Flannery, Lomas, Krupinski and Coover provide guideposts
as to the required height.3"
3. Federal due process rules.--It is also very important to note
that Lyness was decided on the basis of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, and Lyness has extended requirements of due process
under the Pennsylvania Constitution beyond those required by the
virtually identical federal Constitution due process clause. In a case
very similar to Lyness, the United States Supreme Court reached
a conclusion different from Lyness.
Withrow v. Larkin 9 involved a Wisconsin statute under
which a medical examining board created by the state was empow-
ered to investigate allegations of physician misconduct, determine
if there was probable cause to suspend the physician's license, and
in the event it found probable cause, make the final decision
whether the license should be suspended.3" In this situation,
almost identical to Lyness, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the doctor's claim that the combination of board functions
violated due process.35' The Court reasoned that there is a
presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudi-
cators.352  It stressed that courts evaluating due process claims
must review any evidence of actual bias. 353 However, without
evidence of actual bias, officials "are assumed to be men of
conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a par-
ticular controversy purely on the basis of its own circums-
tances. ' '3' The Court further reasoned that the initial decision on
probable cause and the final decision on suspension have different
purposes, and the fact that the same body makes these decisions in
tandem does not result in a procedural due process violation.355
By analogy, the Court observed that judges frequently preside
at preliminary hearings where there is a determination of probable
cause to hold a defendant for trial.356 However, this has never
348. See supra text accompanying notes 325-34.
349. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
350. Id. at 38.
351. Id. at 56.
352. d at 48.
353. Id. at 54-55.
354. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55 (quoting U.S. v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941)).
355. Id at 58.
356. Id. at 56.
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been found by the courts to raise any procedural due process
barrier against the same judge presiding over the ultimate criminal
trial.357  The Court further observed that it is very common for
members of federal administrative agencies to receive results of
investigations, approve the filing of charges, and later participate in
ensuing hearings. 3 58 The Court observed that the risk of bias in
these situations has never been considered intolerably high, and
there is no incompatibility between an agency filing a complaint
indicating there is probable cause to believe a statute has been
violated, and the same agency subsequently deciding, after hearing
all the evidence, that in fact there has been no violation. 59
In rejecting the combination of functions argument made by
the doctor, the Withrow Court stressed that a determination after
hearing not to take disciplinary action is not admission of error in
the prior finding there was probable cause to conduct a hear-
ing.
360
Withrow does not soften the impact of Lyness, because the
Lyness ruling was an interpretation by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Nevertheless, in deciding
how far to extend Lyness, the Pennsylvania courts no doubt will be
influenced by the fact that Lyness already extends the Pennsylvania
constitutional requirements far beyond the identical requirements
357. Id.
358. I&
359. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 56.
360. 1d at 57. The Withrow Court distinguished two prior cases, Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972) (officer who makes a decision to revoke parole may not review his own
decision), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare official who determines to
suspend welfare may not participate in a hearing to review the decision), because both prior
cases involved a specific individual or body reviewing whether there was error in a prior
administrative determination made by the same person or body. In another important case,
Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976), the United
States Supreme Court ruled that a school board, vested by state law with the power to
employ and dismiss teachers, may, consistent with due process, dismiss teachers for engaging
in an illegal strike. The Court rejected the teachers' claims that the school board was not
an impartial decisionmaker because it had been involved in the labor negotiations which led
to the strike. Relying on Withrow, the Court reasoned that mere familiarity with the facts
of the case, gained by an agency in performing a statutory role, does not disqualify a
decisionmaker. Nor is a decisionmaker disqualified simply because the decisionmaker has
taken a position on a policy issue related to the dispute. The Court found that in these
circumstances the school board would be disqualified only if there was evidence showing the
school board was not capable of judging the dismissal case impartially. 426 U.S. at 493. The
Court further stressed the presumption of honesty and integrity in policymakers with
decisionmaking power, and the importance of allowing a state agency to perform the
statutory functions given it by a state legislature. Id at 497.
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of the federal Constitution as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court.
4. Lyness applicability to schools.-In fact, it remains unclear
whether Pennsylvania courts will even apply the Lyness wall of
division pre-hearing board involvement prohibition to school
boards. Does Lyness apply in any way to school boards?
The wide variety of opinions in Harmon v. Mifflin County
School District6' indicates a split by the Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court judges on this point, with some judges contending
Lyness does not apply because a school board merely terminating
employment is not as drastic a step as the regulatory function of
taking away a professional license to practice a profession.362
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the federal courts have
not addressed this issue directly, but the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Krupinski strongly implied Lyness does apply. In rejecting
a claim that due process was violated by school board action on
furloughs prior to a hearing on the furloughs, the court ruled that
Lyness did not apply because a furlough decision is not disciplinary
or prosecutorial in nature; instead, it is a policy or economic
decision related to the number of teachers needed."63 Following
this rationale, rather than the Harmon rationale which focused on
the severity of the board action on the employee, suggests the court
considers Lyness due process requirements applicable to school
boards in the context of dismissal cases.
364
As indicated above, the real inquiry is not "whether" but
"how" Lyness should be applied to school districts. Lyness is a
wake up call. It sounds an alarm that school districts need to be
careful about pre-hearing board involvement in personnel matters.
There is a tension between the relatively permissive Flannery
"actual bias rule" (similar to the rule established by the United
States Supreme Court under the federal Constitution) and the more
stringent Lyness pre-hearing involvement prohibition .3 Al-
though Lyness was a 3-2 decision, it remains the law of
Pennsylvania, controlling on lower courts.
361. 651 A.2d 681 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
362. Id. at 686.
363. Krupinski, 674 A.2d at 685-86, n.9.
364. For an alternative analysis of applicability of Lyness to school boards, see LEVIN,
supra note 248, § 4.02(B).
365. See supra Part Two IV.B.1-2.
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Where does this leave us? How is the tension to be resolved?
How high must school districts construct the Lyness "walls of
division"?
C. Post-Lyness School Board Rules
In establishing school board rules, a reconciliation is needed
among school board responsibilities, practical considerations, and
individual rights under Lyness and other cases delineating due
process requirements. We suggest the following rules in order to
provide the necessary reconciliation.
1. Periodic personnel reports.-In order to help the school
board fulfill its oversight responsibility, the school administration
should provide the school board with general summaries of the
results of annual or other periodic employee evaluations. These
periodic reports should generally indicate the numbers of staff
members performing at the highest level, the number performing
at an unsatisfactory level, and general steps being taken to remedy
problems or improve performance. Together with other informa-
tion routinely coming to directors from other sources, such as
parent input, student testing and achievements, curriculum
information and interaction with school employees, this will enable
the board to judge the effectiveness of the district workforce, and
if appropriate, to require remedial or proactive steps toward
improvement. The board is clearly entitled to this type of
information, and sharing poses no risk of later due process
problems.
Generally, the school board should not receive specific
information about particular employees. Such information poses
a risk of a later due process problem and is unnecessary in light of
the division of responsibility under the School Code between the
school board and the administration. Of course, the school board
has a different role with respect to high level administrative
employees who interact directly with the board. In this instance,
the board has a more direct supervisory role and more direct
involvement in evaluations and compensation decisions. Accord-
ingly, the board should normally receive specific personnel
information about high level administrators. This information is
necessary for the board to fulfill its statutory duties, meaning there
is a compelling reason for the board to receive this information and
the due process balance shifts.
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2. School Board confidentiality and bias warnings.-Some
specific personnel information will invariably be shared with school
board members in various contexts, whether relating to high level
administrative employees or in other contexts as discussed in the
following paragraphs. Whenever information is provided to the
school board concerning a specific employee at any stage, not just
at the time of an impending hearing, the administration should
remind the board of: (1) the confidentiality of information; (2) the
board's potential judicial function; and (3) the due process rules
which limit the information that can be provided to the school
board and require the school board to maintain an unbiased
position prior to any school board hearing. Confidentiality is
important in all cases for the reasons discussed in Part One of this
article, and it is critically important the board follow the Lyness
and Flannery due process mandates of avoiding bias. If a hearing
ultimately occurs, the board must enter the hearing unbiased and
prepared to make a decision based entirely on the evidence
presented at the hearing.3" Lyness requires "walls of division"
between, on one hand, the administration's daily supervisory and
occasional prosecutorial functions, and on the other hand, the
board's oversight and adjudicatory functions.
367
Considering the complexity and unsettled status of due process
requirements, explanation of the legal rules to the school board
presents the administration with an interesting task. The extent of
the explanation which should be given the school board will depend
on the context. The administration might or might not want the
school solicitor to provide this explanation depending on the
context and the extent of explanation required. If a personnel
matter is in preliminary stages and no hearing is imminent, most
likely a simple explanation or reminder of the rules by the
superintendent will suffice. Conversely, if a hearing is imminent or
a fairly complete explanation is otherwise required, the administra-
tion or solicitor will need to explain that the courts have created a
"due process maze," requiring the school board and other partici-
pants to maintain a delicate balance, walk a fine line, and at times
seemingly walk on eggshells. Of course, the administration or
solicitor will also need to explain the following specific rules to the
366. See supra Part Two IV.B.
367. See supra Part Two IV.B.1.
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extent applicable, stressing the importance of careful attention
because courts reverse dismissal decisions based on due process
violations.
3. Complaints about employees/investigations. -When a
complaint is registered against an employee, or the administration
is otherwise aware of a significant personnel problem likely to
come to the school board's attention, the administration should first
conduct an appropriate investigation. Based on the investigation
results, the administration must decide what information, if any, to
share with the school board, keeping in mind the required Lyness
"walls of division."3" If an employee is cleared, or no dismissal
or other school board action is warranted, it will in most cases be
appropriate to share this information with the board. The board
will expect and properly consider its understanding and approval of
the conclusion part of its oversight responsibility. Moreover, as in
Lomas, limited pre-hearing board involvement and board attempts
at resolution short of dismissal should not taint the due process of
a possible later hearing.3 9 Due process involves balancing the
rights of the employee against the responsibilities and burdens
imposed on the government entity.370 In this case, sharing strikes
an appropriate balance, consistent with Flannery and Lyness.371
4. Administrative reprimands.--Many personnel incidents
arise where some administrative action, discussion with the
employee, or even written reprimand is necessary, but the matter
is not of sufficient magnitude to warrant sharing with the school
board. This is an area where the administration needs to use its
judgment, based on the seriousness of the incident or the likelihood
of the board being involved by an outside source, and the school
board needs to become comfortable with the way in which this
administrative discretion is exercised.
5. School Board hearings/charges.-If an investigation
indicates dismissal or other action requiring a school board hearing,
the amount and type of information provided to the board prior to
a formal hearing should be carefully considered and limited to
368. See supra Part Two IV.B.1.
369. See supra Part Two IV.B.2.
370. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
371. See supra Part Two IV.B.
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avoid a due process violation.372 No doubt details of allegations
must be given to the board sufficient to allow board officers to sign
charges in tenured employee dismissal or demotion cases.373 This
is required by state law, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
approved this procedure.374 Moreover, there is no reason why the
same rule should not also apply in cases involving untenured
employees.
Similarly, the filing of charges carries with it a strong indication
that if the charges are proven, the board will likely proceed with
the recommended dismissal, demotion or other disciplinary action,
and enough details of the allegations must be shared to enable the
board to reach this preliminary conclusion. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's apparent approval of the School Code dismissal
framework375 implies the court should also find acceptable some
discussion within the school board of the board's intent to proceed
with the recommended action if charges are proven. Again, this
strikes an appropriate due process balance, considering the
statutory framework and the importance of not wasting public
funds and official time on expensive and time consuming hearings
where the school board would not approve the recommended
action even if the factual charges were proven. The individual
interest in avoiding unnecessary proceedings and humiliation also
dictates no less. This is the message from Flannery376 and is
consistent with Lyness.377 Due process precludes bias, but does




However, Lyness suggests protective measures be used to
avoid actual or perceived bias.3 79 The investigation is best con-
ducted by the school administration, not the board, to avoid
extensive and unnecessary pre-hearing board involvement. If board
action is necessary to implement the administrative recommenda-
372. See supra Part Two IV.B.
373. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1127 (West 1992).
374. Krupinski v. Eastern Northampton Vo-Tech Sch., 674 A.2d 683 (Pa. 1996). See
supra note 308 and accompanying text. This is also consistent with the importance attached
by the United States Supreme Court to allowing a state agency to perform its statutory
functions. See Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482,
496-97 (1976); supra note 360.
375. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
376. See supra Part Two IV.B.2.
377. See supra Part Two IV.B.1.
378. Lyness, 605 A.2d at 1209-10.
379. See supra Part Two IV.B.1.
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tion, the administration, not the board, should prepare a detailed
statement of the charges for board consideration. The statement
of charges will give the board a basis to authorize the administra-
tion to proceed, and satisfy the statutory requirement applicable to
tenured employees' ° The administration's preparation of the
charges further insulates the board from unnecessary pre-hearing
involvement. In addition, the board should not take any official
vote on the charges prior to proceeding because there is no legal
requirement for a vote,381 and to do so may violate the required
"walls of division" and create impermissible "significant involve-
ment.' ,382  Moreover, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Krupinski gave approval to the statutory scheme requiring charges,
the court referred merely to the board "notifying" the employee of
the charges.38
As a further Lyness precaution, the board normally should not
hear the detailed evidence of who said what to whom, nor take the
steps by which the board begins to consider and weigh the evi-
dence. This should be saved for the hearing. One of the defects
identified by the court in Lyness was that the preliminary decision
to prosecute involved judgment as to the weight of the evidence
against the accused, not just a decision to allow a prosecution to
proceed or a decision that if the evidence was proven, some action
would likely be taken." The court found this preliminary
weighing of evidence to taint the later decisionmaking process.31
A school board should not, under any circumstances, make a
commitment as to its decision in advance of the hearing. To do so
would clearly violate the due process requirement of entering the
hearing free of bias. However, school board members with serious
misgivings about taking the recommended action if the charges are
proven should make their feelings known, as part of the school
380. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1127 (West 1992).
381. Clark v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 387 A.2d 1027, 1029 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
382. See supra Part Two IV.B.1.
383. Krupinski, 674 A.2d at 685. By recommending that the board not take an official
vote on the charges, this article is not suggesting that this one factor alone should be
dispositive in determining whether due process requirements have been met. Perhaps the
official vote should not be deemed a due process violation if taken merely as a ministerial
act to authorize the board officers to fulfill their statutory duty of "notifying" the employee,
without any weighing of evidence by the board. However, avoiding the vote is a
recommended precaution to eliminate this issue.
384. 605 A.2d at 1208 (quoting Dussia v. Barger, 351 A.2d 667, 674 (Pa. 1975)).
385. Id. at 1208.
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board responsibility is to authorize commencement of hearings and
indicate some action will be taken if the charges are proven.
Probably the best way to facilitate the permitted preliminary
discussion with the board, without crossing the line of providing too
much information and poisoning the proceedings, is for the
administration to present the board with the specific written
charges (or at least a preliminary draft of the specific written
charges), stressing the warnings that the board is not to engage in
weighing of evidence nor to prejudge the case in any manner.3"
The administration might give the school board some indication of
the employee's arguments and defenses, along with an indication
of the administration's view of the legal strength or weakness of the
case, but neither the superintendent nor the solicitor should
recommend any specific action to the school board prior to the
hearing. They should merely request that the board officers sign
the notice to the employee of the charges.
As if this balance were not already complex enough, the due
process rules articulated in Bruteyn and Coover also preclude the
superintendent and solicitor from providing the school board with
pre-hearing advice, assuming the superintendent and solicitor will
be involved in prosecuting the case against the employee." One
option is to keep the solicitor out of the initial presentation of the
charges to the board. However, this may be unsatisfactory, leaving
the superintendent with the difficult task of explaining the due
process rules and judging how much discussion the rules permit.
Another option is for the solicitor to participate in the pre-hearing
meeting, but exercise care not to give advice on the case. Another
option, if the board believes it needs legal advice or the administra-
tion or solicitor believes the board needs advice, is to limit the
superintendent or solicitor to providing information, with the board
retaining and consulting special counsel at the time the charges are
presented. The board would, in effect, accelerate involvement of
the special counsel who would in any event serve as an indepen-
dent hearing examiner and board advisor at the dismissal hear-
ing." In other words, special counsel would be engaged not just
to advise the board at the hearing, but also for the purpose of
386. See supra Part Two IV.B.1.
387. See supra Part Two IV.B.2.
388. See LEVIN, supra note 248, § 4.01 (offering. a comprehensive discussion of the
procedures normally followed at a school board dismissal hearing).
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providing pre-hearing advice. Another option is for the superinten-
dent or solicitor to take the role of advising the school board, with
others performing the prosecution role.
Fortunately, these difficult judgments need not be made in the
vast majority of cases, because employees guilty of misconduct
more often than not resign without necessity of board involvement
or a hearing.
Of course, it goes without saying that under Lyness the
prosecutorial role of presenting the evidence and recommending
specific disciplinary action at a hearing must be performed by the
administration, not the school board.3 9
6. Resignation and settlement agreements. -Many school
personnel problems are resolved by a negotiated resignation and
settlement of some kind, before or after formal dismissal proceed-
ings are commenced. Whether or not it must be publicly disclosed,
a settlement agreement requires school board approval.31 Obvi-
ously, the board must be given sufficient factual information in
order to make an informed decision to approve or reject a
proposed settlement. This might create a due process concern if
the settlement is rejected and the case proceeds to hearing.391
However, considering the necessity of this process and the Lomas
approval of pre-hearing attempts at resolution, sharing information
in a settlement context should not be deemed to taint any later
proceedings, particularly if the bias warnings suggested above are
articulated and heeded.3' Although probably not required by
law, school boards might consider the precaution of requiring the
employee to sign a waiver of any due process claims which might
arise in a later hearing as a result of sharing information with the
board should settlement discussions fail.
7. Warning-Due process rules not yet settled.-There is not
yet a definitive Pennsylvania Supreme Court case approving these
389. Id
390. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 274,278(c) (West 1995). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, § 5-508 (West 1992).
391. See supra Part Two IV.B.1.
392. See supra Part Two IV.C.2. In addition to being supported by Lomas and prior
Pennsylvania due process cases, this conclusion is supported by the public policy of
encouraging settlement of disputes and avoiding litigation. See Pansy v. Borough of
Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 788 (3d Cir. 1994). See also, supra Part One I.A.4.
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specific suggested school board rules.393 Under current case law,
there is some risk in sharing any information with the school board
prior to a disciplinary hearing.3"4 However, a complete prohibi-
tion on pre-hearing information would be completely impractical,
as well as inconsistent with sound public policy and existing case
law. This article suggests rules based on an interpretation and
reconciliation of Lyness and other cases. These suggested rules
reflect the requirements of Lyness as well as prior cases while at
the same time carefully balancing the interests of the school district
and affected employees, and also considering the practicality of the
suggested and alternative rules in the context of school district
operations. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is unlikely to extend
Lyness requirements to a point which would be unworkable or
impose unnecessary expense on taxpayers, particularly considering
that the Lyness requirements already extend far beyond the
identical federal Constitution due process requirements as inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court.395 Nevertheless,
considering that the law remains unsettled, the school board and
administration should consult the school solicitor for advice on
policy and on the appropriate course in each case, pending more
precise judicial guidance.
8. General board information access policy.-The school
board should develop general policies on school board access to
personnel information. 96  School boards have considerable
flexibility as to such policies, but should develop policies which
reflect school board oversight responsibilities, yet respect the
boundary between administration and oversight, and also the due
process prohibition on "significant" pre-hearing involvement."
An appropriate policy likely will limit personnel file access to
specified sch6ol administrators and provide school board member
access only after a request in an unusual case by either the entire
board or by the board president in situations considered an
emergency. Moreover, a good policy will set forth the procedure
for administrative investigation and reporting to the board or its
393. As noted above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will likely give further guidance
in the Monessen case. See supra note 324.
394. See supra Part Two IV.B.1.
395. See supra Part Two IV.B.3.
396. See supra Part Two IV.A.
397. See supra Part Two IV.B.1.
[Vol. 101:2
1997] CONFIDENTIALITY OF SCHOOL PERSONNEL MATTERS 415
personnel committee on specific personnel situations, rather than
direct board review of files or other direct board investigation.
Conclusion
Part One of this article provided a comprehensive discussion
of legal and non-legal factors to be considered by school board
members and administrators in deciding on release of personnel
information to the public and others who are not school officials.
Part TWo analyzed the difficult issues involved in determining the
amount of personnel information to be provided school board
members in connection with their exercise of general oversight
responsibility and also with their involvement in disciplinary
actions.
The path to reconciliation of the different interests bearing on
release of employee information, to the public or between adminis-
tration and school board, can be precarious for school offi-
cials-like sailing between Scylla and Charybdis. Complications
result from the conflicting values, public policies and legal rules.
On one side, privacy is a fundamental right protected by the United
States Constitution and federal and state laws. On the other side,
government accountability is essential to democracy, and also
guaranteed by various laws. Similarly, school board rights and
responsibilities must be balanced against due process rules and
requirements for effective school administration.
This article has suggested strategies to reconcile these
conflicting pressures. Many of the proposed strategies suggest a
need for school board policies addressing the appropriate disclosure
in particular situations. School boards should carefully review all
existing policies to confirm compliance with applicable laws and
good public policy. To the extent not covered in existing policies,
districts should consider adopting a formal policy consistent with
the suggested strategies. Districts should also consider assigning
responsibility to a particular person, such as the superintendent,
business manager or personnel manager, to make decisions on
release of information.
In addition, to prepare newly elected school board members
for the frequent occurrence of personnel decisions and confiden-
tiality issues, new board member orientations should include a basic
explanation of personnel law and the policies relating to confidenti-
ality and release of information.

